

# CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

8

VOL. 2

**SPRING 1951**

**Korea: Strategy for Destruction**

Andrew Maxwell

**Looking At Lumps,  
Or, The American Press in Full Cry**

Simon Squitt

**The War Against Russia as an  
Historical Necessity**

Oscar Fischer

**War as the Main Obstacle  
— Reply to Fischer**

E. V. Swart

**The Keynesian International**

Paul Mattick

**Material and Documents**

**The Remilitarization of Germany: A Statement  
by the Confessional Church, and A Proposal by  
a Reader**

**A 'Denial' by Pastor Niemöller**

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ULRICH JACOBS (owner).

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 2nd day of October, 1950.

FREDERICK CAMPBELL GILES,  
Notary Public of the City of London.

## EDITORIAL

THIS number of CONTEMPORARY ISSUES is almost entirely devoted to an exposure of the ceaseless and insidious clamour for yet another world war. The sudden hysteria connected with Korea and the threat from the supposed Russian colossus is factually and theoretically scrutinized and the actual contemporary developments revealed to be very different from the fevered dreams invented for us by statesmen, journalists, scientists, and the whole propaganda machine. Once we commit ourselves, in this interim war period, seriously and painstakingly to the work of exposure and, among a multitude of things, dispel the vapours of sudden catastrophe, the process has very surprising results — results entirely at variance with the 'officially' entrenched consciousness — and a good beginning is already made toward a living stream of thought on all contemporary matters.

In the war of exposure to be waged ruthlessly on all sides a scrupulous reading of the Press, as the articles which we publish demonstrate, is indispensable. 'Official' opinion and reporting has not yet hardened into a fascist juggernaut, and conflict of economic and political interests between the various power blocs in the West still express themselves sometimes in open criticism of each other's conduct and much accurate reporting filters through. A thorough combing of the Press at its loose joints, so to speak, to be treated strictly as fact divorced from the odours of propaganda, furnishes us with much that is useful. It is in this work of reading the newspapers carefully and submitting to us excerpts with or without comment that our readers can be of great service and we hope the articles published will serve as encouraging models.

The discussion on 'Utopia' has for reasons of space to be postponed this time though much material has again come to hand. The matters involved are not in any way exhausted and we invite other readers to participate.

Andrew Maxwell

## KOREA: STRATEGY FOR DESTRUCTION\*

TO devote an article to an analysis of the Korean war might seem unnecessary in view of the amount of space devoted to it in the Press. It is true, the newspapers provide us with most of the factual material required for understanding contemporary developments. Yet mere facts are not enough; one must also know how to put them together. It remains that a careful reading of newspapers, despite descriptions, justifications, recriminations, warnings, military reports, etc., fails to reveal a connected picture of events which takes into account the general international situation and the relation of the war in Korea to it, except on a purely superficial level. This negative aspect of contemporary journalism has unfortunately also its positive side: the given information turns into a mere hodge-podge in which truths, half-truths and lies are so intermingled that the average reader is deprived of any possibility of arriving at a real grasp of the situation, gets confused and is thereby forced into becoming a passive or active victim of circumstances. Objectively, the Press as the disseminator of confusion fulfils a function essential to capitalist survival, irrespective of any intentions on the part of individual reporters who are themselves also caught up in the whole process. By using the materials furnished by newspapers on the occasion of the Korean war, we will demonstrate in detail in the following pages what must tirelessly be done in order to undo the work of confusing the public on vital issues.

Commenting on a Press report to the effect that though America was spending 16 billion dollars on direct and indirect armaments, its wise men placed their hopes for the bolstering up of the economy on the additional one billion for the arming of Europe, Ernst Zander wrote more than a year ago:

"... this illustrates the general law that the armaments industry has become the corner stone of the whole economy. It is of the essence of such an economy to prepare on the one hand ceaselessly for the final battle between the main rivals, and on the other to look for a means to prevent a repeat-performance after this final battle and to secure 'peace'. . . . Although capitalism can never achieve its aim and looks for peace in vain . . . it maintains the direction it has taken until it has either completely ruined the world or else is diverted from it by counter forces. 'Unfortunately', it not only meets with many external obstacles on its path, but also creates by friction such ones which aggravate its 'inner' difficulties. It therefore cannot maintain its course and avoid its own

\* Italics throughout are the author's.

decline without eliminating hindrances which lie in its way in the shape of (generally speaking) external and internal enemies. In the final analysis, the available means for overcoming all obstructions can be reduced to two: physical violence in the widest sense (from economic compulsion to war and civil war), and intellectual violence by means of 'propaganda' of any kind (which is in this sphere always fraud and swindle).

If this and the fundamental contradiction of capitalism are firmly held in mind, the various aims of war propaganda in the era of the Marshall Plan are gradually revealed:

In the first place, of course, the people (the so-called 'public opinion') shall be prepared for and bound to what of late has in America been termed preferably 'preparedness'-armament (for the 'final battle').

In the second place, war propaganda gives a pretext for taking comprehensive measures against the internal enemy who in war time can develop overnight from a latent into an acute danger.

In the third place, it provides a justification for the accumulation of abuses and the economic destruction which become everyday more senseless with the accompanying disproportions on the basis of which the capitalist system muddles along.

In the fourth place, it serves to draw attention away from the profounder causes of the economic, social and political misery."<sup>1</sup>

To judge from newspaper reports, events during the next nine months did not strongly support these remarks; for the cold war was becoming a little cooler, and the material foundations of the world were being built up under the ægis of the Marshall Plan. But then 'suddenly' on 25th June the North Koreans launched their 'unprovoked aggression' for which 'the world' (in particular the U.S.A.) were 'unprepared' — and the democracies were compelled to switch from economic rehabilitation to a frenzied rearmament, and (in the interests of 'security') to lead the attack on democratic rights in their own countries. In a twinkling, there arose a positively deafening chorus, in which the 'progressives' were clearly to be heard yelling as loudly as they could, extolling the peaceful virtues and naturally the 'fatal' military weakness of the Western Powers, in contrast to the insatiable and blood-thirsty imperialist designs of Russia backed up by a terrifying armed strength. The clamour served to 'prove' the 'moral necessity' for rearming and for postponing the exercise of the democratic way of life.

Nevertheless, these propagandistic explanations notwithstanding — for it is after all precisely their function always to prove the 'inevitability' of the results of power politics — one does not need more than an averagely good memory coupled with a careful reading of this same Press, to lay bare the whole hoax.

At the conclusion of the Second World War, Korea was partitioned, the industrial north going to Russia, while the agricultural south fell to the U.S.A. In this way the economy of the country which had developed precisely through the interconnection of industry and agriculture (the north and the south!) was largely wrecked at one blow, and the Koreans given an

<sup>1</sup> CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, Vol. 1, No. 4, Autumn, 1949.

<sup>2</sup> See 'Looking at Lumps, or, The American Press in Full Cry' by Simon Squitt, p. 266.

incentive to allow themselves to be dragged by competing imperialists into a so-called 'war for national unity'. In this way the Koreans were hamstrung and possibilities of an independent development quashed. It was known from the outset that Russia, pursuing in Korea a policy similar to that in the rest of her satellites, would of necessity have to create a police state, i.e., to bring into being a strong armed puppet government in order to cope, in the first instance, with internal resistance. Indeed it was for just this purpose that North Korea was originally given to her, Russia having a far more developed system of repression than America. That being so, the policy of America in South Korea up to the time of the so-called 'unprovoked' aggression deserves consideration, remembering that the provocation was exactly partition and was from the beginning counted on!

Some quotations from the Press will take care of this. As early as 20th January the House of Representatives rejected the Administration's Bill for the continuance of economic aid to South Korea. The feeling of the Congress was, writes the *Times* Washington correspondent (23rd January):

'... That help must be concentrated where it will do most good.

*Korea* hardly comes under this heading. In the event of a war in the Far East nobody believes there would be any hope of holding a small piece of a peninsula attached to a hostile main land and there is general dissatisfaction at the way the Koreans have used the help the United States has already given.'

Nor was assistance to Korea at any time considerable. Since the end of the war, the total aid did not amount to more than \$400 m., a large part of which remained unspent at the outbreak of the Korean war. Of the amount spent, the corrupt and inefficient government had control, so that it comes as no surprise to hear the complaint made by the United States in May that for all the money spent, there was nothing to show. The much-vaunted development of the economy was no more than a lie; all that was true was that with the help of the reactionary puppet government the mass misery was for some considerable time 'stabilized' at a very low level.

There was in fact every material reason for the existence of restiveness. To cope with the situation in Korea it was the political policy of America to support the extreme right and its methods of suppression. This is clear from a review of a book *Korea To-day* in which we read:

'Undoubtedly there were mistakes and Mr. McCune is severe with them. Generally speaking, they involve the back seat given to economic reform and, as he sees it, the antagonizing of non-Communist liberals in favour of the extreme Right.'

In contradistinction to the actual practices in Korea, we find that the 'official' policy of the United States, as stated by Mr. Acheson on 7th March, sounds a very different note:

'Broadly speaking, the United States policy in the Far East was, Mr. Acheson said, directed towards encouraging and assisting the efforts of the peoples in that area to improve their welfare and security, to stabilize and develop their economies, to strengthen free institutions and

<sup>1</sup> *Korea To-day* was written by the late G. M. McCune, Professor of Oriental History at the University of California, and was commissioned by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

advance the cause of self government, free from outside domination.' Korea was one place in which the United States could continue [!] to take well-defined, positive steps to help a free democratic country to survive in face of the efforts of Communism to engulf it. As the President had already said, Korea was a testing ground in which the validity and practical value of ideals and principles of democracy which the Republic was putting into practice were being matched against the practices of Communism which had been imposed upon the people of North Korea. . . In recent debates a number of members of Congress had indicated their feelings that the possibility of failure made them doubt the wisdom of the United States giving a helping hand in this effort. But, Mr. Acheson added, "it is my belief that American policy should be based on the determination to succeed rather than on the possibility of failure". (The Times, 8th March, 1950.)

Putting together the publicized 'intentions' and the *actual* practices of America in Korea, we get the following result: A puppet government under American orders and official propaganda provide for consumption abroad the indispensable 'democratic' façade behind which the regimentation of the population and the destruction of living standards proceed. Yet again we have to stress: the 'intentions' of governments as stated in their *public* utterances have no significance whatever except as bluff, and the 'failure' of the 'good' intentions is the success of the real policy that is planned for in secret and achieved in the long run despite all temporary setbacks. Thus we see what Mr. Acheson's 'freedom from outside domination' means in the following message from Seoul, 7th April, which appears in The Times, 8th April, under headline, 'American Advice to South Korea':

'Angry shouts greeted an announcement by President Rhee in the National Assembly to-day that the United States had *threatened* to reduce economic aid to South Korea. He said Mr. Hoffman, the Marshall Plan administrator, in a letter received two days ago, had threatened to reduce aid this year from \$100 m. to \$60 m. unless the Assembly passed a bill providing for a balanced budget and took other steps to check inflation. Aid for next year might also be reduced.

'Yoon Chi-yung, Vice-Chairman of the Assembly, said: "South

\* Not every one of course falls for Mr. Acheson's suave misrepresentations intended for 'public' consumption. We find Abd-el-Krim, leader of the Nationalist movement in French North Africa, describing the situation somewhat differently (U.P. from Cairo, 20th August):

"The Korean war was the inevitable outcome of "mistakes" by the Western Nations and the United Nations in imposing "counterfeit governments" that thrive only on corruption and oppression. . . . When war breaks out these people have no cause to fight for. . . . "This is what is happening with the South Koreans to-day. It is the same case with the people of Indo-China, who will not fight against their brethren attempting to liberate their country from the imperialists and their puppet Bao-Dai regime. . . .

And it is true of North Africa where a despotic imperialist regime is forced upon thirty million people. Let Korea be a lesson. . . ."

The United States has lost prestige and antagonized oppressed people, he said, by supporting France in Indo-China and sending arms to the French in North Africa "to suppress the independence movement".

What Abd-el-Krim does not see is that the United States cares not a rap for such prestige or antagonism, for the suppression of independence is precisely the object of its policy, just as it is of the Stalinist 'liberators'.

Korea is an independent nation. [Whom did he think he was bluffing? Mr. Hoffman with his big stick? A.M.] No other country must interfere with her affairs." . . . President Rhee also announced that he had decided [!] to call elections in South Korea on 25th May. He had received a letter from Mr. Acheson, the American Secretary of State, urging the advisability of an early poll. He had intended holding the elections in November.'

Economic impoverishment and the threat to withhold rations is used to compel a puppet government politically.

Not only was discontent and unrest factually the case in Korea and deliberately maintained; but aggression was in another important respect by no means unexpected. We quote the following:

'Mr. Johnson [the Defence Secretary, that is — A.M.] . . . said that there was no specific warning that an attack on South Korea was imminent. "I suppose no one is fully satisfied with the intelligence that comes in, but I think we have a right to expect now that our intelligence is going to be pretty good." ' Mr. Johnson said that Intelligence reported Sunday morning raids for a year or so, and that a build-up existed for a year. There had been no report however of a build-up "of a special nature" just before the invasion of South Korea, he said.' (A.P. from Washington, 22nd August.)

Even more detailed is the statement of Brigadier-General W. L. Roberts (U.P. from Washington, 9th August):

' . . . testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, [he] said the North Koreans staged continual border raids during the last two years before the actual invasion and at least *ten or fifteen times* went through all preliminary motions of a full-fledged attack. But until the fateful day in June the alarm always proved false.'

All this signifies that the United States, *for at least two years*, was possessed of information which showed that the North Korean Stalinist puppet government was ready for an attack on the South. Only one thing stood in the way of that attack: The American Occupation Forces. The moment these were withdrawn, the United States, to quote Senators Wiley, Lodge,

<sup>a</sup> As a contrast however to this estimate of the Intelligence we have Stewart Alsop writing in the New York *Herald Tribune*, 25th August:

'Shortly before the Korea attack, one of the more intuitive [!] of the State Department's policy-makers sensed that the Kremlin's next move might well be aggression by one of her satellites. He accordingly ordered a study to determine where the Kremlin was most likely to strike. During the course of this study, a Defence Department view of the military situation in Korea was requested. The Defence Department quickly returned an answer — the South Koreans were so strong that the North would never dare attack. Thus Korea was stricken off the list of possible areas of satellite aggression, and the United States was even less prepared to deal with the danger than it otherwise would have been. This might be interpreted as an Intelligence failure. In fact, it was nothing of the sort — the Central Intelligence Agency had estimated with reasonable accuracy the strength of the North Korean forces. It reflected something a great deal more serious than inadequate Intelligence — the total breakdown of any close working relationship between the State and Defence Department.'

We must not take Mr. Alsop's last remark too seriously. But it is clear: The State Department had its own plans, amongst which figured largely just this unprepared-



Hickenlooper, and Smith, in their 'relentless scrutiny' of American foreign policy issued on 13th August, gave the Kremlin 'the green light to grab whatever it could in . . . Korea and Formosa'. And when we see Mr. Johnson indicating that the decision to withdraw American Military Occupation forces in Korea was 'made two years ago' (A.P., Washington, 22nd August), it only remains to ask: why was the much later date chosen rather than any other? In answering this we also answer the pathetic question of David Lawrence (New York *Herald Tribune*, 2nd September):

'Why was the defence of Korea for instance, considered of no importance to the people of the United States last January? Who made the decision to suppress the facts about Korea's strategic importance? . . .'

Before answering the question, however, a glance at the campaign itself will throw much light on the strategy of the United States in the era of the Marshall Plan. It is common knowledge that the distinguishing characteristics of the Korea war to date (11th September) are: The use of untrained, inexperienced young troops who continually get butchered in a murderous campaign.<sup>6</sup> The failure of wireless communications, inadequate tanks, inadequate guns, inadequate bazookas (New York *Herald Tribune*, 23rd August). The (from an ordinary military point of view) irresponsible and incompetent military command. This latter is well illustrated by the following reports. The first comes from Joseph Alsop (New York *Herald Tribune*, 18th August):

'With U.S. forces in Korea — In two previous reports in this space, the hard fighting on the Chinju approaches . . . has been described at some length. While well conducted as an exercise, it must now be added that in the outcome this tough and painful American effort seems to have served no visible military purpose whatever. At heavy cost our men fought their way forward. They had hardly reached their objective on the heights above Chinju when they were recalled again, and with bitter anger retraced their steps to the same positions from where they had jumped off.

' . . . Little was added to the security of our main Korean harbour, Pusan (although this excuse will also be offered) since our actual defensive position is now almost exactly the same as it was before. Meanwhile we lost the immediately valuable airstrip Pohang at the other end of the beachhead.'

The second report, published in the New York *Herald Tribune* the same day, says:

'Disgruntled marines, after a 27-mile advance, were suddenly pulled back and sent to the rescue of Army units besieged by guerillas that struck from the rear. One consolation — from a marine point of view — was the substantial number of Russian vehicles the transportation-starved marines were able to bring back. The marines' mission will be to clear out guerilla forces attacking the 5th Regimental Combat Team. . . . The enemy force . . . caught units of American artillery in their flank attack. Despite the fact that this tactic had become a familiar

<sup>6</sup> A Guadalcanal veteran commented, 'Believe me, this is even more murderous than we had there. I know of at least two squads in which nearly every man was a casualty of some sort'.



pattern in this campaign, the artillery had no infantry protection. . . There can be no doubt that the withdrawal order came as a blow to marine morale, but officers acquainted with the overall picture assured the men that the offensive was by no means a wasted effort. A spokesman said: "It proved we could break through when we want to. We disorganized and killed hundreds of the enemy and threw them off balance. Our boys didn't die for nothing." . . . The Marines were drawn back almost to the exact point from which they started their attack.'

On the question of security, so vital at home but it appears not necessary abroad!, a third leader from the New York *Herald Tribune* gives the following picture (18th August):

'Despatches from the front indicate a lack of security in preparations for the recent American offensive that enabled the North Koreans to determine in advance where the blow would fall, who would deliver it and when. . . What has been happening in Korea has been a source of astonishment and concern for weeks. There have been a few general statements urging caution in the treatment of military information, but *by and large practically nothing that the North Koreans would care to know has been withheld*. We were told which divisions were on their way to Korea and which ones were slated to go, when they were landing at Pusan, how many ships they travelled in and how long it would take them to unload, what weapons the men carried, and their degree of training, when they would go into battle and on what sector of the front. It has been one wide-open story — an intelligence officer's dream and the nightmare of a counter-intelligence team.'

Once we test the propaganda of the 'unexpected' outbreak and therefore of 'unpreparedness' against the actual facts and, for a yardstick, remember America's immediate ability to organize something as recent as the Berlin Airlift, a feat by no means of mean proportions, the details of the Korean campaign can be explained only in the following way. It reveals a determination on the part of the allies — in this case mainly America — to protract an incident. The rest of this article will be an attempt to indicate and understand what actually was gained by the crisis and its extension.

The moment we consider the large-scale strategic bombing of Korea (better known as 'saturation bombing') we uncover one of the underlying factors of the campaign. But we must first of all make it clear that the, what one might call 'purely military' results of strategic bombing have to date been practically negligible — so that 'military' justifications are no justifications. The negligible results persist despite the fact that since the middle of August 'the strategic effort . . . (has risen) . . . to levels quite comparable to those witnessed in all but the last years of the second World War'. An illustration of its ineffectualness as a military factor comes with dispatches commenting on the peak saturation raid made on a twenty-six-square-mile target round Waegwan. The U.P. dispatch reads:

'The strength of the sudden Communist push from the North indicated that the North Koreans may have shifted some of the four to six divisions they had massed on the west bank of the Nakdong River north-west of Waegwan to the northern sector before the American B.29s dropped 850 tons of bombs on the west bank.'

'Reconnaissance planes which flew over the blasted and burning twenty-six-square-mile target north-west of Waegwan the next day could find no trace of the 40,000 to 60,000 troops believed there.'

The A.P. dispatch added the following to substantiate the same report:

'The Communists poured out of the area hit by the B.29 bombers west of the Naktong River. They jumped off from an area between Waegwan and Kunwi.'

And, as if to ensure that the conclusion will be obvious, David Lawrence then comments (New York *Herald Tribune*, 24th August):

'What this means, of course, is that high-level bombing did not disorganize the troops of the enemy or prevent them from realigning their divisions in time to make a concentrated attack the next day.'

The reason for this 'failure' of strategic bombing we are told (New York *Herald Tribune*, 15th August), is that:

'In Korea it is operating under unusually adverse conditions. Strategic bombing is at its least effective when used against a primitive government whose peasant armies live on the country, utilizing a minimum of machinery and equipment. Tactical air is crippled by a mountainous, densely-wooded terrain, affording ample enemy cover in gorges difficult of access, further protected by frequent bad weather . . . Korea shows strategic air as a comparatively slow, costly and *indiscriminately destructive way* of getting tactical results.'

A few reports will make this destruction, which is one of the real aims of the war, more concrete.

'Correspondents' reports suggest,' says The *Times*, 16th August, 'that most of the towns and villages lost to the enemy have been smashed up by bombing or in a few cases by naval gunfire. It is natural that every possible effort should be made to lighten the heavy burden borne by the land forces by means of air support, but the bombing of friendly territory is likely to have unpleasant repercussions if foreign observers conclude that it is excessive. Its effects on the South Koreans can only be guessed but there is no doubt that it is regarded with apprehension and even some indignation elsewhere in Asia. . . At the same time the moral factor, immensely important, can be forgotten only at great risk [!]. We have already grasped the fact people would much rather be saved than "liberated". We must realize, too, that when the work of their hands is destroyed by allies, they want to be sure that no mistake has been made in estimating the necessity of the act.'

Whatever foreign observers may conclude — and what does such a conclusion amount to in any case once the damage is done? — the plain fact of the matter remains that the length and breadth of Korea is being smashed to pieces — to be sure, in the best possible spirit! This is what America's 'determination to succeed' in democratizing Korea amounts to in reality. How The *Times'* correspondent and kindred spirits can in the face of this be uncertain of the effects of 'liberation' on the Korean people remains a mystery, unless we ascribe it (as it appears we must) to a pre-occupation with justifying the atrocities perpetrated there by the western 'democracies' (we must not forget that Britain, France, Belgium, etc., are also involved in the dirty game). We are not to be fobbed off with high-sounding platitudes about the moral factor, spiritual values and such

trumpery. A people whose homes, food, factories and fields have been smashed, and the rebuilding of whose country is made impossible, have already suffered the penalty of physical destruction. It is only moral corruption, dishonesty and fundamental *indifference* to the real suffering (characteristic of present-day liberals, progressives and all the fair-minded who are always 'fair' to the tyrants but never to slaves), that allows then of such nice distinctions as: 'Nevertheless it is better to be physically annihilated with all the democratic "forms" than to have perished under 'totalitarianism.' Truly a consolation to a nation to have as an epitaph, *e morto canonicamente e con tutti gli ordini!*

From the New York *Herald Tribune* comes this story:

'A North Korean soldier who said he joined the Communist Forces in the vicinity of Taejon, which the Americans lost a month ago, said "Everything in the town is burned out. The civilians are hungry. The army takes rice, and the American planes bomb and bomb and burn the rice. There is very little left to eat."'

And then our friend David Lawrence must needs write:

'... strategic bombing is exciting [shades of Vittorio Mussolini! — A.M.], spectacular [just like a Cecil B. de Mille movie! — A.M.], and theoretically destructive enough to win a war. It hasn't happened that way in Korea.'

As if to underline this 'art-for-art's-sake' offensive we read a 'warning' from that two-bit Cassandra Walter Lippman (New York *Herald Tribune*, 19th August):

'A victorious campaign back up the peninsula, assuming the Korea war can be localized is, of course, entirely within our power. Everybody knows that. Nobody would think of denying it. We do not have to prove to the world that the United States, supported by the British Commonwealth, is able to defeat North Korea. What we do have to prove to the world is that we can help a country without destroying it. If we have to spend a year building up ground forces in the beach head while the Air Force demolishes the roads, bridges, public utilities, and factories of all Korea, the "victory" when it comes will indeed be pyrrhic. Even if the operation is successful, the patient will be dead. We shall not have proved that we can contain aggression but only that we can wreck a country while the aggressor is trying to enslave it. That is not what we wish the Japanese, the Germans, the French or anyone else to think, that reliance upon collective security comes down to.'

A few questions, Mr. Lippman: why do we *have* to spend a year building up ground forces when it could be done in a few weeks? Is it perhaps because we *want* to go slowly so that by the time ground forces arrive, the economy of an entire peninsula will have been practically destroyed? Be assured, Mr. Lippman, that the 'patient' will die, though, for one so knowledgeable as yourself, it is surprising that you did not recollect at once that in such cases the 'doctor' is always said to have acted to the best of his knowledge and abilities. But perhaps your memory will 'spontaneously' revive when the time comes for justifying the unfortunate patient's demise! And, Mr. Lippman, why are you so perturbed about the possibility that this death may give rise to wrong ideas about the meaning of collective security

in Japan, Germany, France, etc.? Can it be that you fear that these countries figure on the list of Doctor Uncle Sam's patients 'awaiting treatment'?

Leaving Mr. Lippman aside — he is after all only an ideologist busy prettifying the development with his scribbles — we repeat: 'Collective security' (collective *auto-da-fe* would be more accurate!) in fact 'comes down to wrecking a country' and nothing else.

Consequently, it is with no surprise that we note the following feature of American military policy:

'... strategic bombing ... (dominates) ... the whole American defence program. . . It appears . . . to many superficial observers to be the simple, inexpensive [!] way to defeat an enemy — just drop tons upon tons of bombs from miles up, no matter where they hit and no matter how indiscriminate the operation necessarily must be from high altitudes — and there will not be much need of a ground army or a navy. . . What the United States needed last week on the central Korean front was several kinds of low-level bombers, the kind that dive close to the target and really see what they are aiming at. These units, often called "tactical aviation" are very scarce nowadays in the United States Army because most of the money and the man power has been used to develop a program of high-level bombing for use in Europe [Europeans please note — A.M.]. . . A re-reading now of the publicity given strategic bombing these last few years will confirm the impression that the three armed services were not treated as co-ordinate branches and each given a chance to build up what it needed. That kind of autonomy was lost in the passion for "unification" which has turned out to be an allocation of most of the money to a single concept of strategy — the high-flying bombers of the United States Air Force — while the Navy has largely been put aside and the Army was deprived of men and equipment, tanks and planes.' (David Lawrence, New York *Herald Tribune*, 24th August.)

As far as Korea is concerned it is clear that the country is being and will continue to be wrecked from end to end, and dismal 'prophecies' to that effect are already being aired to prepare the public for the news when the time is deemed ripe. . .

'Most of Korea will be wrecked in the process, and after we have freed [!] the country, what are we going to do? Re-build the wreckage and keep a large army there permanently? Scarcely an alluring future, for ourselves or for the Koreans.'

'We' rightly take first place in these calculations; after all the Koreans are only a lot of yellow 'gooks'. And again:

'The war-shattered country will need policing as much as reconstruction, and if we are to escape even the appearance of "Wall Street Imperialism" the whole task must be a UN task, with a multi-nation force and interim regime doing the job.'

One thing is certain. However the war ends there will be policing, but only an ineffectual pretence at reconstruction. In order to dispel all illusions about reconstruction — about which, when the time comes, much will be claimed, the following must be said. Of course there will be grandiose plans, shipments of food in totally inadequate quantities to meet the real needs of

the hungry people, etc., etc., all of which will be as heretofore 'administered' by a corrupt and inefficient government . . . and in the end there will be nothing to show for it, except the mass starvation of the Korean people.

The Korean war exposes in little (for 'only' a nation of 25 million people is involved) the purely destructive content of modern capitalism in the period of its maximum decay and collapse. In its progressive phase, as against mediæval agricultural society, capitalism (despite its painful negative features) not only brought industrial expansion and a higher standard of living to sizeable portions of the globe, together with an extension of political freedoms, but its remarkable development upwards was accompanied by a tremendous increase of the populations assimilated to the world market. The decisive and disastrous tendency is now in the opposite direction. Everything which in the heyday was done is in the decline to be undone. With America alone producing over half the world's goods to be realized profitably it is no longer possible to allow the development of competitive productive resources elsewhere. This tendency became generally decisive during World War II when nations as advanced as Germany and Japan had to be crippled, and the process inexorably sweeps into its grasp the remaining nations of the world. The policies of partitionism become more and more widespread. But the brutal suppression of whole economic areas is by no means an abstraction for it carries with it the necessary destruction of whole peoples. The greater the phenomenon of economic unassimilability the more the dominant nations stand confronted with the need for the total destruction of dissident peoples. The real meaning of the Korean war, as far as the Koreans themselves are concerned, is to be seen in this. With this in mind it becomes clear that in U.S. Military policy the army and navy become mere adjuncts to the main weapon of destruction, strategic or saturation bombing. Under such circumstances it is of no consequence whatever that the army is untrained and badly equipped and that it sustains as a result 'unnecessarily' heavy losses both of men and material. (These themselves also have their uses and help in the 'solution' of such problems as surplus manpower, and the disposal of accumulated stocks of obsolete war material — it is no accident that the troops in Korea were equipped with weapons dating from World War II which had been lying and rotting in stock at Okinawa.)

The political counterpart of the destructive development is totalitarianism, irrespective of whether America or Russia dominates. We may rest assured that the totalitarian requirements are being taken care of. Having persuaded India not to press a demand for a public meeting with Stalin on the question of an immediate peace settlement for Korea, it was reported (*Observer*, London, 20th August) that:

'it will be up to *secret negotiations* of the Security Council to conduct negotiations for a peaceful settlement — if any. The meeting resumes next Monday to continue examination of the Russians' "compromise", offered by Mr. Malik for breaking the United Nations deadlock without recourse to the "Little Six" committee.'

Only the actual international situation in the period following the end of the war will enlighten us about the secret decisions. Naturally it does not at all follow that the matters on the agenda of the secret negotiations are limited to Korea. There are many other 'problems' to be settled, and Korea

is not surely the most important one! But whatever happens, whether Korea or some other country disappears behind an iron curtain, one thing is certain: behind the façade of war hysteria, further aspects of the international strategy of destruction are being worked out by the two business partners, Russia and America. Is it any wonder that on these weighty questions, discussion of which could have been prejudiced by public negotiations, the big brigands preferred secrecy, thus ensuring that they would keep all the plums for themselves?

From our factual presentation this conclusion alone can be drawn: the war in Korea is part of the tendency which became decisive with the second World War, and has as its essence the destruction of the productive resources and the non-assimilable peoples of the world in the interests of capital. It must be understood that armament production and war constitute the very lifeblood of capitalism in its present stage of decay and that the actual military operations themselves are, at the present moment, only one form of the ceaseless economic and political war that a small international minority as the instruments of capitalism, is waging against the whole of humanity, destroying bit by bit the wealth accumulated by millenia of toil and hardship and adding to this wreckage the mangled bodies of its producers, men, women and children, in an increasingly frenzied and apocalyptic holocaust. At the present stage of capitalist rot, the old distinctions between peace and war fall entirely to the ground: peace is warlike and war 'peaceful'. It is economically dominant America that is the spear-head and driving force of this tendency, though it is surely not the only one involved. Still, its pressure is everywhere to be encountered.

Some reports will show us America at work:

'Drew Pearson on 27th January writes: "The Dutch have told Field Marshal Montgomery in Europe that they can't afford to assume their proportionate responsibility under the Defence Pact because of the heavy expense of operations in Indonesia, which in one year cost the Dutch 436,000,000 dollars.

That year, Holland received 476,000,000 dollars of Marshall Plan funds. So the U.S. really is paying for the war in Indonesia."

In *The Times*, 11th April, we read the following:

'War in Indo-China is probably costing France as much as the sum set aside each year in the Marshall aid counterpart fund. In other words its termination would double this country's investment capacity or might alternatively permit a noticeable remission of taxation. The war weakens France economically and divides her politically.'

America we see is killing two birds with one stone in each case: independent colonial development is further destroyed, and the metropolitan areas in their own imperialist adventures are bled white and driven into greater dependence upon America.

We are now in a position to appreciate the real significance of the statement in the New York *Herald Tribune*, 17th August, that 'the Korea war, tragic as it is, has provided a blueprint for the future'. And, in order to ensure that there can be not the slightest doubt about where the responsibility rests, we note that when President Truman got reports from General J. Lawton Collins and Admiral Forest P. Sherman on their tour of the Far East recently, he commented:



'Their reports were most satisfactory and highly gratifying to me. . .'  
And the report goes on to observe that:

'His statement . . . appeared to be a personal assurance of Presidential approval of Gen. MacArthur's conduct of the Korean war.'  
(U.P. from Washington, 29th August).

To end this section it must be stressed that the 'final' outcome of the Korean war (as far as Korea is concerned that is) is of not the slightest consequence. Whether the country will ultimately be occupied by the Stalinists or by the Americans is irrelevant the moment we understand that the 'finale' is only . . . the destruction of the country.

It is now time to return to the question we asked earlier: why was this particular date chosen for the outbreak of the Korean war rather than any other? The answer will be found in a review of certain features of the international economic and political situation during the first six months of this year, to which accordingly we now turn.

\* \* \*

As if made-to-order to enable us to plunge *in medias res* comes this report (The Times, 21st March):

'The world supply of primary commodities, staple foodstuffs as well as raw materials, has been transformed since the end of the war. Generally, although there are exceptions, the protracted shortages arising from war-time dislocations have slowly given way to growing surpluses. In the markets for agricultural commodities the change was first reflected in prices as long ago as the first quarter of 1948. Last spring the downward movement in prices spread to minerals, and for several months the almost general trend . . . spread not a little alarm throughout the economic world. Some powerful *artificial* interventions including price support for farm prices in the United States, American stockpiling, Marshall aid shipments, and restrictions of output by producers and in some cases serious strikes stopped the downward movement before it got out of control. . . Nevertheless, now that accumulated post-war arrears of demand have been largely met and war-time dislocations of production largely corrected, the basic trend of world commodity prices *remains clearly downward*.'

A comment here is apposite: a careful reader will note that we are presented with two completely opposite statements. (1) We are told that artificial interventions (we must remember this excellent phrase!) had stopped the downward trend of prices before it had got out of control. (2) Despite everything, prices are going down, so that the downward movement we can only conclude was not stopped in time and has got out of control. What are we to think of the rest of the Press when one of the most 'reputable' papers which employs 'experts' to 'inform' the public is incapable of fulfilling the most elementary demands of logic? Only this: that *objectively* its function is so to confuse the mind that it becomes impossible to make two and two equal four. It impedes the simple exercise of reason which any averagely intelligent *child* would be capable of doing, and thereby prevents a real picture of what is actually happening from reaching the public. Add to this constant deliberately calculated war-scares to take away even what

remains of sane attention to the real matters in hand, and the whole essence of the Press is nakedly revealed.

But prices, to revert to the matter in hand, are, despite artificial regulation, still an index of available production so that it does not surprise us to note that along with sagging prices there go mounting surpluses.

On 3rd April, we read in *The Times*:

'In the U.S. steelmaking capacity has increased so much that in the industry it is said to be much in excess of *all possible needs in ordinary times*. Although it is commonly being said that there is no satisfying the demand for steel, those "ordinary" times, in the view of at least one prominent steel manufacturer, are not too far off.'

As far as coal is concerned, despite the strikes, *The Times*, 2nd February, wrote:

'There is no doubt that the present capacity of American mines is much higher than *normal* peace-time demand.'

In Europe the coal surplus was described as 'persistent'. Tin was estimated on 29th March, to be 45,000 tons in excess of consumption, and 'the trend would be accentuated later'. As for cotton:

'The failure of cotton consumption to expand "is a world problem of great importance" according to the International Cotton Advisory Committee . . . which is meeting in Washington to discuss measures for increasing cotton consumption in face of a world surplus. . . The review said it was "difficult to envisage any significant and sustained advance in global cotton consumption in the near future with cotton and cotton textile prices at current levels, and in the context of continuing world dollar shortage, unless special mitigating arrangements are made."

Particular attention was drawn to intensified competition from rayon, the competitive price position of which had been greatly enhanced in Europe as a result of devaluation.'

The same for oil, shipbuilding and so on and so on. It is unnecessary to add further quotations. As we shall see, a 'mitigating arrangement' was found, viz., the Korea war!

The moans of the farming community also make pretty reading! A report of the I.F.A.P. (*The Times*, 29th May) states:

'Although the world's population is increasing at the rate of 2 per cent. annually and full employment has sustained the level of demand, the higher food output in the western hemisphere and the recovery of production elsewhere may soon bring larger supplies than the international market can absorb at economic prices for the producers.'

Sir Herbert Williams, addressing the Guild of Agricultural Journalists in London on 11th April, was even more concerned:

'There is a glut of food in the world in many respects.' The situation

'Just for the sake of 'contrast' we add:

'Unofficial reports from North China state that the deficiency of food is extremely serious. It is known that in some parts peasants have already begun to eat the seed grain they should keep for the spring planting. Detailed information is not available here, but some experienced observers believe that China is facing the most serious food deficiency in her recent history.' (*Times*, 8th April.)

A little later it was announced that the 'deficiency' amounted to a 'famine' which was likely to be worse than that of the 1870s when some 9,000,000 people died.



in the United States is quite fantastic. Maize is in vast supply. It should be ground up and going down the necks of our chickens and pigs. There is no fundamental reason why bacon should be rationed in this country or that eggs should be short at all.'

We interrupt this dismal tale of unassimilable surpluses to introduce a last element before taking up the threads of the whole thing. This is unemployment. On 6th February, *The Times* noted that unemployment had risen to 4,480,000 in America, 'the highest figure since the end of the war. At this level it represented about 7 per cent. of the country's civilian workers'. In April, the situation was better and was expected to continue that way until June [1] when:

'there will almost certainly be a different tale to tell, as schools and colleges end their terms and a great new addition is made to the nation's labour force.

What to do about providing employment for this and other, annual, additions — from the growth of population — has become a matter of anxious concern to the Administration, and not less to many business men, worried by the belief that the Government is planning relief operations like those of the 1930s."

In Europe we get this picture from *The Times* of 26th May:

'In spite of this heavy volume of investment activity, inflationary pressure was reduced in most European countries. In some of them a deficiency of internal demand was evident, and unemployment became a major [!] preoccupation. The problem was particularly serious in Belgium, Germany, and Italy. The survey expresses the view that failure to solve the unemployment problem in these countries may place a serious strain on their economic relations with other European countries. . .'

What has been said so far about surpluses (including surplus manpower) is really the essence of everything and leads us to see the necessity for the war: The moment the dislocations caused by World War II had to some extent been eliminated and production of consumer goods had to a limited extent got under way again, the West at once experienced a crisis of over-production particularly acute in America, leading to a fall in prices and the impossibility, despite all artificial interventions such as price support and Marshall Plan, of disposing of consumer commodities at what are (under capitalism) economic prices. Which means only that the production of consumer goods has *in general* become 'uneconomic' and that means must

\*The Government knew better of course, and so, Korea having 'providentially' occurred in the meanwhile the problem was 'solved' by a bill to enact 'universal military-training . . . providing for six months to one year of service for seventeen-year olds. Mr. Johnson acted with the approval of President Truman'. (U.P. message from Washington, 17th August.)

'After the seventeen-year olds have completed their training, he said, they should be available for service, "in such capacities where they would most be needed in the event of a national emergency".'

For instance, they might be sent, without proper training, to die in a theatre of war, like the young G.I.s in Korea; or they might be used against the 'internal enemy' when needed! Of course, one begins with a bill for one-year training; but once in the armed services, 'emergencies' arise from nowhere and the service is lengthened, without naturally asking the conscripts if they had other plans for the future (as for instance, recently happened in England).

be found to divert production into the only remaining 'economic' channels, viz.: armaments. This involves of necessity the liquidation, in ever-increasing quantities, of the surplus population which in present-day capitalism has also become 'uneconomic'.

Into this unmanageable situation came the Korea war, to 'solve' the crisis and in the very doing of this only to accelerate the development we have sketched — as nice a piece of timing by America as was ever seen! The immediate effects of the war itself proved this beyond the slightest doubt, and without burdening the reader with reports, of which there have been many, and will be more, for we cannot dispense with them in the interests of proper documentation, it will be enough to say: shortages of every description became manifest almost at once. Steel (times fortunately were no longer 'normal'), coal, tin, wool, lead, copper, aluminium, textiles, etc., were engulfed in the mad rush for war preparations. Naturally, prices soared fantastically because of this insensate buying: tin in a short time rose from less than £700 to £850 a ton; lead, antimony, molybdenum, zinc, rubber, etc., were all to use a Stock Exchange euphemism, 'harder', and to close this we may note that wool prices soared overnight at the opening of the wool auctions in Sydney by 50 per cent.\*

The same tendency at once became noticeable in employment. The British Delegation to the United Nations after much bickering came at last to an agreement on the subject of a resolution dealing with full employment, and, writes the *Observer* (the date is missing from the cutting before me):

'Now that everybody has agreed to it, the delegates have suddenly come to realize that it has a certain unreality with the war in Korea and even greater dangers on the horizon. In any case, *European rearmament should of itself take care of full employment.*'

In the United States we find the same process at work. An A.P. message of 1st September from Washington quotes Mr. Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce, as saying that the nation's

'economy was gradually moving toward full employment before the Korean crisis. With increasing defence preparations, it may be expected that this trend will continue at an accelerated pace.'

We will leave it to these gentlemen to solve the contradiction between this remark and the figures of unemployment (official figures which are always unreliable and are wangled so as to give a lower figure than is actually the case), though we shall offer a suggestion: the trend to 'full employment' became noticeable in May when, as we read in *The Times* of 21st May:

'The "bull" market in stocks carried prices this week to a new high level to date. Although it has not yet "made the front pages" of the newspapers — lacking as it does some of the spectacular character of such movements in times past — already it has contributed to the general cheerfulness.

\* And at once produced a threat of enormous, uncontrollable inflation in Australia which is of course, if we may so put it, practically founded on wool. Measures (controls of all kinds) have been urged in order to save the situation, in itself already difficult enough because of rearmament and the diversion of men and materials for that purpose.

'It is a development not less remarkable [!] for having occurred at a time when it is widely agreed that within recent weeks the "international situation" — meaning the cold war with Russia — so far from getting better has *definitely worsened*.'

Since Korea the first signs of a 'shortage' of labour are also appearing in the United States, even before anything like the full impact of rearmament has made itself felt. A U.P. message from Washington, 4th September, says:

'Secretary of Labour, Maurice Tobin, said last night that a "labour market" had developed in several areas of the country but expressed confidence defence production man-power needs "can be met". In a radio interview he revealed that the United States Employment Service was recruiting workers for defence plants and that he had personally

<sup>19</sup> Exactly how *un-remarkable* this is can be seen from the following report (*Observer*, London, 30th April):

'A leading Harvard economist, Sumner Slichter, while deploring the cold war, frankly declares that "from the narrow economic standpoint" [!] its effects are beneficial. It provides just those vast government expenditures which capitalistic America would be so reluctant to vote in normal times, he says. "There is the deepest irony [!] in all this, because hostile Russia has almost certainly prevented a long-feared economic post-war bust. It is being said that Russia has the power to bankrupt America any day she wants simply by turning friendly."

We merely remind the reader of the sentence we used with reference to the pre-Korea situation, 'the cold war was becoming a little cooler. . .'. Irrespective of Russia's 'friendliness' (which is a bit of nonsense, Russia having been so friendly all along as to observe nicely all the provisions of the treaties signed at Yalta, Teheran, Potsdam, etc., which precisely laid the foundations for the cold war!) it is clear: some 'incident' was needed in order to warm up the cold war which, we have shown, as it temporarily died down slightly, brought into prominence . . . the 'long-feared economic post-war bust!'

And, as if to ensure that there shall be no doubt at all on this score, we find Don Ross writing in the *New York Herald Tribune* (6th September):

'Our hopes and fears are bound up these days with two black lines. One shows the dimensions of the Korea beach-head and the other indicates the state of the nation's economic health. The beach-head line wavers frighteningly, but the business line keeps pushing up near the top of the chart and hitting new highs. We are in an economic boom if not a military one. Many of us are aware, with a profound feeling of guilt that the Korean war and the satisfactory state of business bear more than a casual relationship to each other. The G.I.s at Waegwan and Pohang are dying not only for our country, but also, in a sense [!], for our prosperity. Many writers on economic affairs have told us that business is booming *precisely* because there is a war. Though the first rush of hoarding appears to have spent itself people are still buying things they don't really need because they fear that increasing production for war will diminish the supply of civilian goods . . . unemployment rolls are being whittled down with the rise in the production of guns and butter [!]. New York State discharged 500 employees whose job it was to take care of unemployment insurance payments to the unemployed.

One widely read writer on economics advised us that we can now breathe more easily, for the depression that has been hanging over our heads since the end of the last World War has been dispelled by the Korean war.

But despite the advice, many of us do not breathe easily. Since when has massive blood-letting really improved the health of the economic body?

Don Ross just misses drawing the conclusion that must be drawn from his remarks by failing to ask one simple question: 'Who can breathe freely, and of which part of the economic body is the health definitely improved by the blood-letting?' The answer is, a section of American capital alone, to which everything else is being slowly but surely sacrificed.

appealed to employers to "refrain from pirating and hoarding labour" in the Korean war crisis.<sup>7</sup>

Still, precautions against workers taking advantage of the 'labour market' are not being neglected. In a Bill to enlarge social security to the working population, there figures the 'Knowland amendment' about which we read in *The Times* of 8th August:

"The President also disapproves strongly of the so-called "Knowland amendment", added in the Senate. He trusts that Congress will remove this as soon as possible, lest it should *undermine* the safeguards already enacted against loss of unemployment insurance benefits *if workers refuse to accept employment with sub-standard wages or working conditions.*"

About Truman's 'disapproval' we must remember that he also 'disapproved' of the rigid controls voted him by Congress soon after the outbreak of the Korea war, and 'vetoed' them (for the moment). But that under 'pressure' of events (which the poor man of course had helped to prepare) he was 'forced' . . . to use them, and will be forced to use them more and more drastically, . . . in the defence of 'democracy'. Nevertheless the shortage of labour is bound to increase in the United States too, and then the hunger for surplus population will force the State into 'pirating and hoarding' labour (Mr. Tobin could not have used a more accurate expression). And to make sure that all necessary precautions against unrest generated by sub-standard wages or working conditions are taken in good time, we find that in the United States:

'Industrial bigwigs will be sent to school in Chicago to learn how to protect their factories against Communist sabotage and propaganda.

What they will be taught is super-secret.' (*Daily Express*, London, 28th August.)

Naturally all unrest will be put down to 'Communist sabotage and propaganda', for genuine unrest apparently exists nowhere.

The advantages gained from the Korean war by the West within the first few weeks during the military 'defeat', can in general be summarized as follows: There will be a reorientation of production from consumer goods to armaments. Coupled with this there will of necessity be in the western countries a worsening of the conditions of work and the accompanying increase of political regimentation.<sup>11</sup>

\* \* \*

With this we reach the end of our survey which has revealed that with the Korean war the tendency basic to this, the last and retrogressive stage of capitalism, of destruction of productive resources and the annihilation of populations and the concomitant international totalitarian development, has finally become overriding and decisive in the whole system which no longer has the slightest progressive significance whatsoever. All pretence to the contrary is nothing more than dupery calculated to give to the slaughter and ruin an appearance of 'moral' inevitability.

The nature and outcomes of the Korean war are a terrible warning in

<sup>11</sup> Under these circumstances German and Japanese re-armament becomes essential, both because they can supply America with certain *much needed* goods, and because of the need to make preparations for 'internal security' there in the coming period as much as in the rest of the 'democracies'.

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advance against the ever-looming Third World War. For there is nothing progressive about a war which resolves itself simply and only into mass murder and destruction on the basis of the highest scientific developments of civilization. Unless the coming war can be prevented, not only present civilization, but any possibility of achieving a rational society (for which the material foundations still exist) in a foreseeable future, will completely vanish. The war can be stopped by determined resistance to the propaganda and actions of those now in power. To begin this resistance it is necessary in the first instance only to apply critical reason to the words, actions of Governments and their consequences, to allow reason undiverted from the matter in hand by external excuses such as 'emergencies', 'the lesser evil', etc., to pursue its criticisms to their logical conclusions, thereby arriving at an understanding of events on the basis of which alone it is possible to put a halt to the madness of contemporary developments.

11th September, 1950.

## THE CRIME WAVE

### 1. Juvenile Delinquency

Mr. G. D. Wallace, former Labour M.P. for Chislehurst, speaking at Swanley, Kent, yesterday, said that some former Labour members were still searching for employment because their only crime was that they were Labour M.P.s. Mr. Wallace said he was not referring to himself. Some of his former colleagues had tried to get interviews, but were not given them because of the unfortunate nature of their politics. It was a crying scandal that such a thing should exist and pointed to the sacrifice entailed in being a member of the Labour Party.

*The Times*, 27th November, 1950.

### 2. Capital Punishment

Sir Robert Sinclair, president of the Federation of British Industries, speaking at the annual luncheon of the Multiple Shops Federation, at the Dorchester Hotel, yesterday, said that excessive taxation was a reflection of Government expenditure at a level which no country could sustain and remain economically sound. Private savings were gradually being dried up and there was nothing more demoralizing and even humiliating to people than having to live on capital.

*The Times*, 24th November, 1950.

### 3. Corporal Punishment

Sir Andrew McFadyen, a vice-president of the Liberal Party, spoke at Nottingham last night of the disunity in the party, which, he said was causing great misgivings in Liberal associations. . . . He respected the right of every M.P. occasionally to refuse the Whip and vote in accordance with conscience; but not on every occasion. Independence in that degree was incompatible with the maintenance of any party.

*The Times*, 2nd December, 1950.

Simon Squitt

## LOOKING AT LUMPS, OR, THE AMERICAN PRESS IN FULL CRY

IN that great American institution (no, not the *Saturday Evening Post* nor *Life*) the magazine of 'Endless Variety in Stories and Pictures' — this diligent reader found 'The Alarming Prediction of What Can Happen Here'. To be brief, *Coronet* of May, 1948, carried a 'special feature' by Messrs. Joseph and Stewart Alsop, presaging a sequence of events which, if permitted to commence, would lead to 'The Decline and Fall of the U.S.A.' (the perceptions of the mass reader at whom that little cultural product called a magazine is aimed, will be sufficient to appreciate the aptness of the 'original' title, but not fine enough to catch any of its imperial twang).

In the article, the Bros. Alsop contrive the election of one Homer Winsome, a dark-horse Republican candidate for President. Winsome subsequently shows himself to be an unenlightened Republican (in direct contrast to such 'enlightened' Republicans as Vandenberg, supreme internationalist *à la mode*), and therefore a *genuine* reactionary — an isolationist [!!] on top of it all! Homer, once in office, brings chaos to America's charitable benevolence and good will (as embodied in our foreign aid programme), by a downright selfish programme of 'giving business the green light', with the resulting exclusion of foreign aid from the national budget. Thus G.L.P. (the Green Light Plan) is in, and E.R.P. out. Now the co-authors have set the stage for that sequence of events destined to lead our 'arsenal of democracy' to hopeless ruin. The results of our withdrawal of E.R.P. aid are, according to the Alsops, the loss of Greece, China, France, Germany, Italy, and finally, all the nations of the Eastern Hemisphere, including those on the continent of Africa. In addition, the Soviet Press issues news of the perfection of a 'People's Democratic Atomic Bomb' even more powerful than the 'American Imperialist Atomic Bomb'.

And what is the response of Handsome Homer to the grave danger of Communist totalitarian engulfment which faces these sacred shores? A programme named after his dominant cabinet member, Secretary of State, Melvin String — the String Emergency Programme, the main features of which are outlined below:

1. Defence budget increased to \$60 billion, to provide a giant armed service and a vast continental radar screen.
2. A universal service law, placing under the Federal Manpower Administration every able-bodied citizen from 17-65.
3. Control of the national economy by the Federal Resources Mobilization Administration, empowered to regulate all prices, allocate priorities for all raw and manufactured materials, and to change the management of any non-compliant industry.
4. Internal security confided to a new Department of Home Security, with unlimited powers of arrest, internment and secret trial.



Having outlined this programme of fascization, our authors go on to show how String, now President by *coup d'état*, flies to Moscow and there negotiates with Stalin 'the Soviet-American Treaty of Peace and Non-aggression'. The main clause of the treaty is that which provides for the splitting of the world along Hemispheric lines — East and West controlled respectively by Russia and the U.S. [Neat, eh!]

The authors hasten to end with a description of the 'People's Trials', the institution of the Alaskan camps, and the law for the regulation of the Press. They might well have ended two lines later with: 'Thus freedom died', but, displaying the Tone, Culture, and Sophistication required by *Coronet* and the general milieu of democratic journalism, they quote a great defender of that great defender (the Catholic Church) of human rights:

'This is the way the world ends,  
Not with a bang, but a whimper.'

— by the Hollow Man (Mr. T. S. Eliot). But as if that weren't enough, the Alsops leave us the following gem as a last word: 'And one of the chief charges against former Secretary of State Vandenberg (who always enjoyed a large-sounding phrase) was his alleged remark, "It is a challenging contemplation that the emblem of the U.S.A., which was once the eagle, must now be changed to the jackal".'

Looking back on the article, one might easily characterize it, in regard to total effect (that intended by the authors, and otherwise) as pure, undistilled crap. There is much to warrant this label, especially if one is the slightest aware of the true facts surrounding the quasi, hemi, pseudo, non, anti, and bi-partisan policies of Congress (take your pick — all are equally meaningless), since the abject identity in principle of the policies of the two great American parties is well known. However, since the crap is undistilled, we find indeed that there are some lumps which were not fully digested by the distortionist Alsops, and which have more and more, in the two years since their article was printed, come quite accurately to represent the contemporary trends in America's political and economic policies.

The Alsops based themselves upon the contention that the course which America must take in order to 'preserve world peace' is that of enlightened anti-Soviet internationalism. In a note appended to the article they wrote: 'Had they [the Americans] maintained the great effort to reconstruct a war-shattered world, had they pursued a policy of dispassionate firmness towards Russian expansionist ambitions, they would have achieved in the end that real settlement with the Soviet Union [Ah — Yalta, Potsdam, Teheran! — S.S.] and that peace with freedom for which the whole world so longed.' Not much comment is necessary on this last tidbit of wisdom, except that one need only pick up a paper and read, on any day of the week, about our great efforts at reconstructing the world, and our policy of dispassionate firmness toward Russia. Our Press is indeed Alsopian. But the thing that is missing is any mention of peace, much less one with freedom. And why? Because the Alsopianism is no more than meaningless drivel. Our efforts are not, and have never been, aimed towards reconstruction or peace, and as for our dispassionate firmness towards Russia, well . . . let the evidence appear.

Returning to the undigested lumps mentioned previously, we find that several of the Alsops' predictions have proven true, regardless of their faecal basis. (The reason for this is quite simple — whether America's policies are 'isolationist' or 'internationalist', they are still imperialist, and the result, at home and abroad, is more or less the same.) A glance back at their summary of the fascization programme which was to have taken place under the impact of isolationist policy, shows that it compares amazingly with several recent developments which occurred under our Marshall Plan — 'Internationalist' policy.

Alsops' Fables No. 1: *Defence budget up to \$60 billion.* The Real Thing: 'President Truman to-night put the nation's economy on a limited wartime basis, and demanded immediate enactment of higher taxes for everybody. . . He said that proposed \$30 billion defence expenditures would go up sharply.' (N.Y. *Daily News* — 10th September, 1950.) An interesting sidelight on this subject was provided by a column in the N.Y. *Post* of 28th September, 1950, under the byline of Leonard Lyons: 'Last week the U.S. Treasury completed the printing project of the new income tax forms. These forms have the newly legislated increased tax rates. This printing job cost \$1½ million. . . Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder dined at the White House and told the President about this printing job, that the new forms were ready for mailing. "But I haven't signed the legislation bill as yet," the President reminded him. "And you must have ordered the forms before Congress even had voted on the bill." . . . "Mr. President," replied Snyder, "I had confidence in you and in the American Congress." Confidence that is in Truman as an untalented 'yes-man'.

Alsops' Fables No. 2: *Universal service law for 17-65 year olds.* The Real Thing: Projected compulsory U.M.T. Truman's recent calls for a 3 million man standing army.

Alsops' Fables No. 3: *Control of economy by Federal Mobilization Administration — empowered to regulate prices and allocate priorities.* The Real Thing: 'One of the major ideas retained from the mobilization of the civilian economy then [during War II — S.S.] was the post of overall "co-ordinator" . . . Under the defence programme, Mr. Symington, who heads the National Security Resources Board and has the task of devising plans for Presidential approval, must also act as mediator and adjuster . . . (for) . . . many departments.

'A chart of the defence set-up chosen by Mr. Truman would show lines of communication stemming out in a variety of directions from Mr. Symington's office and a single line running from the co-ordinator's square to the President.

'Probably the most important of the lines terminating in Mr. Symington's office is that of the National Production Authority, an agency set up within the Department of Commerce and captained by William H. Harrison, on leave of absence from the International Telephone and Telegraph Co.

'Other lines of the chart would lead to the Interior Department, where again a special unit has been organized to handle problems growing out of the supply and distribution of petroleum, natural gas, solid fuel and electric power; to the Agriculture Department, which will have charge of food and the distribution of farm equipment and fertilizer; to the Interstate Com-

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merce Commission, charged with overseeing transportation, storage and port facilities; to the Labour Department, entrusted with keeping tabs on the nation's labour supply, and to the Federal Reserve Board, watchdog of consumer and industrial credit trends.' Note the huge bureaucratic set-up, with enormous powers in the hands of its overall co-ordinator, who is himself, just as his President, only another cog in the wheels of this quickly growing fascist grist mill.

Also: Fable No. 4: *Internal security confided to a new Department of Home Security, with unlimited powers of arrest, etc.* The Real Thing: The story on this can be gotten by reference to three clippings: (1) *N.Y. Daily Compass*, 23rd September, 1950 — 'In the last major action before its two-month election recess, the House to-day swiftly overrode President Truman's veto of the catch-all "anti-subversive" bill by a vote of 286-48. . . . The Senate was expected to muster another two-thirds majority to write the controversial bill into law before recessing shortly after midnight. . . . Shouting down suggestions for an hour's debate, the House began to vote five minutes after reading of the President's 5,500-word veto message was concluded. . . .' (2) *Daily News*, 24th September, 1950 — 'A filibuster-weary Senate to-day enacted into law over President Truman's veto, the drastic anti-subversive bill. The Anti-Communist Act, approved by a veto-defeating House yesterday, sets up strong federal controls over Communists, spies, dangerous aliens, and suspected saboteurs. All Communist and Communist-front organizations must register under the act. Any one suspected of sabotage intentions can be tossed into a concentration camp at a time of national peril.' (3) Next to the article quoted above from the *Compass* of 23rd September, appeared: "'Truman's Seven Points Against the Bill": He said it would — 1. Aid potential enemies by requiring the publication of a complete list of vital defence plants, labs, and other installation. 2. Require the Justice Department and the F.B.I. to waste immense amounts of time and energy attempting to carry out what Truman called the unworkable registration provisions. 3. Deprive the country of the great assistance of many aliens in intelligence matters. 4. Antagonize friendly governments. 5. Put the government in the thought control business. 6. Make it easier for subversive aliens to become naturalized citizens. 7. Give government officials vast powers to harass all citizens in the exercise of their right of free speech.'

A few points on the quotes above. However 'honest' and 'anti-reactionary' the President may on the surface seem as a result of his gallant fight against the bill, he exposes himself to anyone who peers behind the veil of hypocrisy. For example we read: 'As for the Kilgore "concentration camp" plan, Truman indicated the version incorporated in the omnibus bill is not "effective" enough, because it contains language disclaiming any intention of suspending the writ of *habeas corpus*. He said, "It may be that legislation of this type is needed", but that the whole problem should be studied more thoroughly.'

As far as the F.B.I. 'wasting its energies' is concerned, it is commonly known that every war scare is delight to Hoover & Co., since each threat of 'foreign invasion' or 'internal sabotage' provides new opportunities for dipping into the pork-barrel.

But what really interests this writer, is the type of creature that provides

the propaganda for these recurrent scares. Recently we ran across just such a phenomenon — one Jerry Greene, of the *Daily News* Washington Bureau, a military intelligence officer during the last war who says, with much trembling and trepidation (in the *N.Y. Daily News* of 11th September, 1950): 'At any hour of any day or night, Soviet Russia can wipe out much or all of any city or several cities — in the U.S., with A-bombs. . . . There isn't much we can do to stop such an attack.' [Read with sweating palms and fluttering kishkes.] And a few lines later: 'The top military planners are not planting these ideas with the hopes of spreading propaganda for more appropriations.' [Really?!] 'They have more money available now than they can spend in the time at hand. Informed estimates here are that the Soviets may have as many as 50 A-bombs ready in their stockpile. . . . Defence experts figure that if the Russians want to start a war, they will, without warning, launch perhaps 200 bombers for a modern-day Pearl Harbour attack on the U.S.'

On the question of the strength of the Russian peril we may perhaps be enlightened by a chart which Frederick L. Schuman (a pro-Stalinist professor) presents in a book entitled 'International Politics' published in 1949.

United States			U.S.S.R.		
	Millions of tons	Date	Millions of tons	Date	
Steel	32	1913	15	1946	
Prod.	80	1944	25	Planned	1950
			50	Planned	1960
Pig	31	1913	11	1946	
Iron	55	1944	19	Planned	1950
			60	Planned	1960
Coal	517	1913	166	1940	
	616	1944	250	Planned	1950
			500	Planned	1960
Millions of barrels			Millions of barrels		
Oil	34	1913	31	1940	
	206	1945	35	Planned	1950
			60	Planned	1960

A little simple division will tell any boob, journalist or not, that in 1946 Russian steel production was half that of America's in 1913, and one-fifth the U.S.'s 1944 figure. Of pig iron, Russian 1946 production was one-third of U.S.'s 1913 figure, and one-fifth her 1944 figure. For coal the ratio is 1:3 representing Russian production for 1940 in relation to U.S. for 1913; 1:3.75 for the Russian-1940, U.S.-1944 figures. And for oil the ratios are 1:1:6.5 for the following relation: Russian-1940: U.S.-1913: U.S.-1945 production.\*

In other words, the question (and the answer) we pose to Mr. Greene, is — so what if the Russians have some A-bombs? Where are they going to get the enormous quantities of steel and iron to build the plants necessary for the construction of a large fleet of planes to deliver the bombs? And

\* All approximations in calculation were made in favour of Russian production — which this writer feels was highly exaggerated by Schuman to begin with.

secondly — doesn't Greene know that 'top military planners' (Vannevar Bush) have been palpitating over the fact that large strategic bombing fleets (*ours*) are out-of-date? But of course that was in books not designed for the masses!

On 14th September, Jerry finished the series of articles on America's military position (the first of which was quoted above), with these revealing words 'The best prospect facing the citizens of the U.S. to-day from a military standpoint is a long series of "colonial wars", costing billions, using resources and killing men. This hopeful view holds, of course, only if Russia doesn't want to start anything worse.

'Korea is the first of these wearing engagements.

'The painful probability of the "little wars" yet to come is back of the proposed \$40 billion to \$50 billion defence budget for fiscal year 1951 which already is kicking around the White House.

'These are the opinions of the high strategists at the Pentagon. From a coldly practical viewpoint, they don't see any real period of peace anywhere in the world soon.

'As these soldiers view it, if the Soviets don't go to work on us with atom bombs first, the first defence line for protection of American cities for years to come will be Korea, Japan, Indonesia, India, Iran, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia.

'The strategists believe that if the Soviets don't push out an air blitz against U.S. cities, or launch a sudden drive westward in Europe, the least they will do is to keep the pressure on hard in scattered areas of the world.

'That's why the highly controversial 70-group Air Force has been forgotten, because we are now building toward 100 or more groups and it will take four years to get them. That's why the ten division figure for the Army has been cast aside and the strategists now want twenty, perhaps as many as thirty. The strategists are figuring on a minimum of twelve fleet-type fast aircraft carriers in operation, as quickly as the ships can be pulled out of mothballs and the crews recalled to duty.'

Two days after Mr. Greene's palpitating series ended, the following editorial piece appeared in the *Daily News*, titled 'How to Survive a Panic' which we are now in a position to see as excellent political advice though not intended by the editor: 'A brake-shoe in an I.N.D. subway train short-circuited Thursday morning . . . and filled the cars with white smoke. . . . Some passengers took to yelling "bombers", "war" and the like. . . . The incident went to show how jittery a lot of people are just now, what with *all the A-bomb and war talk going around*. . . . But it also . . . showed how NOT to act when you're in a crowd that gets some kind of sudden jolt, scare, shock. . . . This fact is one to keep firmly in mind at all times and especially during cold wars, warm wars, hot wars and *war scares*.' [!!!] With this, we have the effects of the four masterful war-scare articles by Mr. Greene dealing with our inadequate radar and air-fighter defence against possible fleets of 200 Russian-made B.29s and B.50s, laden with atom-bombs — and you have at the same time the lie-direct. In the attempt to scare his readers Mr. Greene inadvertently points out, that the pressure which the Communists will continue to exert in various places around the world, will be for a long time a very convenient excuse for indefinitely putting our economy on a military basis.

So much for the propagandistic or ideological relationship between America and Russia. It is high time we took a look at what the established relationship is in actuality — for by their fruits shall they be known. In an editorial in the *New Republic* of 28th August, 1950, entitled 'The Price of Leadership' dealing with a statement signed by Senators H. Alexander Smith, N.J., and Henry Cabot Lodge, Mass., 'usually classed as moderate or liberal members of the minority', and Senators A. Wiley, Wisc., and Hickenlooper, Iowa ('of Lilienthal fame') we read the following confession and accusation: that 'the price we paid for (the) token participation of Soviet Russia in the war against Japan was *unnecessary*' [my italics — S.S.], and that the 'Kremlin was in effect given the green light to grab whatever it could in China, Korea, Formosa'. An editorial in *The Nation* of 2nd September, 1950, takes us a step further in regard to this relationship and we would do well to present it in terms of *charge* and *fact*. It quotes the Republican on the question of the Democratic administration 'giving the green light to Russia in Korea', and then provides some rebuffs to these wreckers of parliamentary harmony and unanimity:

(Republican) *Charge* — 'The green light was never a bipartisan policy. It was solely an Administration policy.'

*Fact* — 'On 19th January, 1950, the House voted 192 to 191, against any further aid to Korea. Of the 192, 131 were Republicans, 61 Democrats. One hundred and seventy Democrats voted in favour of further aid and only twenty-one Republicans. . . It was only on the most drastic appeals from the President and Acheson that the House on 10th February, reversed itself by a vote of 240-134, but even then the Republicans were opposed, ninety-one against, forty-two in favour.'

*Charge*: 'That the *Administration* had written off Korea as indefensible.'

*Fact*: This is believed to have been the view of Defence Secretary Johnson [Now replaced by the very man whose mission to "save" China from the Reds was a distinct "flop": George Marshall — S.S.]. It was, on the record, the view of the Republicans in Congress. A Republican minority report of the House of Foreign Affairs Committee issued in July, 1947, contained this passage: "To expect Korea to withstand the aggressive political tactics of the Soviet in a surrounding climate of rampant communism would be to expect an isolated and powerless Luxembourg to repel the ideology and tactics of Hitlerized Europe. . . Our position is untenable and indefensible."

In respect of the record in Korea, the *N.Y. Times* of 14th September reports: '... defence officials of the Korean republic had warned that the Communist army was strong and getting stronger and that it was just a question of time before the word for attack was given. On 12th May . . . two officers put Northern strength at 182,400 men.'

The truth is flagrant enough. And what did Brig.-Gen. Roberts, Commander of the U.S.-U.N. unit in Korea, have to say, — 'I don't recall,' said Gen. Roberts, 'the Chief of Staff in January telling me such a figure as 175,000, but *it is possible*.' (*N.Y. Times*, 14th September), and he went on to add 'I wouldn't have believed him anyway, because he had access to the same information I had, and I was not so informed. This report three months after the attack appears to be a hindsight observation.' [What is 'possible', General? — that Maj.-Gen. Yung, Chief of Staff of the South

Korean army *did* report this figure, and that you are lying to save your skin; or that you were aware all along — aside from any reports which you 'wouldn't have believed anyway' — that the North Koreans were building a relatively powerful war machine easily capable of forcing the South Koreans to their knees, but that you waived this so that at the last moment, MacArthur and the Horse Marines would have to be called on? Is it 'possible' that you were in on the plan to allow the North Koreans to sweep down to the tip of the Korean peninsula, ravaging, looting, burning, and killing; that you knew of the scheme to maintain a line around Pusan for several weeks as an excuse for continual bombing raids on North Korean industry, so that when the 'police action' was over, and 'peace' had been brought to Korea, these industries would be permanently unable to produce for any kind of reconstruction and competitive effort; that you knew Austin would maintain the diplomatic stalemate in the U.N. long enough to allow U.S. troops to pull a repeat performance on the North Koreans in sweeping *up* the peninsula — ravaging, looting, killing, etc.? Or are these comments invalid because they are 'hindsight observations', General?] The item closes with this interesting sentence: 'General Roberts, an Army veteran of forty-one years' service, is slated for retirement at the end of this month.'

I imagine that all this has been just too, too embarrassing for the General. In fact, such mix-ups, due to sudden changes in official U.S. foreign policy, have become so widespread and embarrassing that our own dear President recently visited MacArthur on Wake Island — probably to get things straight, i.e.: to close up all the loop-holes previously open to the public. We quote the *Daily News* of 15th October, 1950: 'President Truman and General MacArthur conferred for three hours on this barren mid-Pacific atoll early to-day and settled the main points of American policy in the Far East. Truman told reporters that he and the U.N. supreme commander reached "complete unanimity of view" with regard to bringing "peace and security to the Pacific as rapidly as possible. . . We are fully aware of the dangers which lie ahead, but we are confident that we can surmount these dangers with three assets which we have: First, unqualified devotion to peace; second, unity with our fellow peace-loving members of the U.N.; third, our determination and growing strength!"'

Is this the same Truman who said, on the day after Hitler's June, 1941, attack on Russia: 'If we see Germany winning, we ought to help Russia, and if we see Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany, and in that way let them kill as many as possible, although I wouldn't want to see Hitler victorious under any circumstances. Neither of them think anything of their pledged word.' After closer examination, we see that it is the same Truman and the same politics but the difference in utterance expresses not only the difference in situation, but the specific change in the style of public utterances in the intervening decade. Such a development was inevitable, what with the organization and consolidation of demagoguery in such a remarkable structure as the U.N. The *art* of political chicanery had become, in effect, a *science*.

Returning to Truman's duplicity, a recent review written by Richard Strout on 'The Man of Independence' by Jonathan Daniels, should aid our understanding considerably. The review by Strout (of the *Christian Science*

*Monitor*) was entitled 'The Education of Harry S. Truman', and appeared in the *New Republic* of 16th October, 1950: 'After reading Jonathan Daniels' new and comprehensive biography, you reflect that the most surprising thing about Truman is his constant ability to surprise. . .'

'In a speech at Denver, in the 1948 election, Mr. Truman denounced "special interests" and "Wall Street" a dozen times. But he has just picked Walter S. Gifford, head of the multi-billion dollar American Telephone and Telegraph Corporation to be our ambassador in London, and Robert A. Lovett, Wall Street banker, to be our Undersecretary of State. — *Do these incidents show an interesting range of activity beyond the easily predictable?* [Lord save us from such as these!]

'Truman has none of the subtle finesse, or deviousness of F.D.R. [He's not such a smart bitch, you mean — S.S.] Roosevelt had a reasoned liberalism. But Truman's is more nearly instinctive; it comes out of his solar plexus rather than his brain. [Maybe out of his rectum? — S.S.] Truman had little use for F.D.R.'s brain trust; they talked too fast, and as companions he preferred jovial people like Harry Vaughan.' [It seems that Vaughan's Joviality has gone into a Deep Freeze, of late — S.S.]

'No reader can follow the dramatic assumption of office by the inexperienced Truman, absolutely uninformed about the details of America's most crucial military hour, without questioning the system of government that makes such a hiatus possible. . . As one of the reporters covering the White House, I shall never forget the humility of the dogged little man, gleaming behind his thick lenses as he talked at his early Press conferences. He was so humble that it was almost painful, and he seemed to have so much to be humble about.' [How right you are!]

\* \* \*

To conclude, I should like to render a protest and a plea to the various journalists, book-reviewers, modern poets, magazine writers, politicians, and bureaucrats with whom I have herein dealt; and also to their compatriots who make a living from quackery and chicanery.

Gentlemen, if this is the only way you can maintain yourselves, you stand exposed. But why not be a little more neat and careful about your work? Do the job in a less slipshod manner, be a bit more consistent, and a bit less obvious — cover your tracks. Or as Rabelais so excellently puts it when quoting the remarks of the privy to the folks that come there to do their business:

Shittard  
Squittard  
Crakard  
Turdous,  
Thy bung  
Hath flung  
Some dung  
On us:  
Filthard  
Cackard  
Stinkard,

St. Anthony's fire seize on this toane,

If thy  
Dirty  
Dounky

Thou dost wipe, ere thou be gone.

And for the job use *your* newspaper.



Oscar Fischer

## THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA AS AN HISTORICAL NECESSITY

**I**N the June, 1950, number of *Dinge der Zeit*, Joseph Mackiewicz declared: 'I am proud to be called a "Warmonger".'

More explicitly: Mackiewicz agitates for war against Russia because he considers such a war desirable.

Mackiewicz is not alone in this opinion. It is one of the few hopeful signs of our present troubled times that a wider circle of convinced supporters of democratic principles have arrived at the same or similar convictions. I include myself among them.

It seems important to me, however, not only to express agreement with the confession of being a 'Warmonger' but, even more, to discuss the motives and the train of thought which leads to such a 'confession'. It is not sufficient to agree with the conclusion as the political reasons for 'Warmongering' are of equal importance.

### 1. The theory of the 'Great Business Partnership'

The 'Great Business Partnership' about the existence of which Joseph Mackiewicz speaks is much more an argument of political propaganda than a political reality. A business partnership presupposes common business interests but the contradictions which exist between America and Russia are of such a pronouncedly principled nature, that any idea of a 'partnership' very soon reduces itself to fiction. The only one who ever believed in, or dreamed of, such a partnership was perhaps Franklin D. Roosevelt, together with his narrow circle, i.e., chiefly his somewhat peculiar family, Wallace, Hopkins, Morgenthau, and smaller figures of the same set. But Roosevelt in particular was one of the most problematical individuals of our epoch and the probability is that no other political myth will be destroyed by history as ruthlessly as the Roosevelt myth, typical product of a crisis psychosis followed by a war psychosis.

Roosevelt's illusions about the possibilities of an American-Russian business partnership led to this — that in all important international dealings he neglected America's interests in favour of Moscow's. In other words, due to infantile illusions, Roosevelt sacrificed the interests of Western democracy to the demands of Stalin's totalitarianism. Mr. Roosevelt was undoubtedly incomparably more useful for the consolidation and expansion of Russian imperialism than the whole 'cominform' can ever be.

Roosevelt's role, his politics and their tragic consequences are instructive examples of the fact that an American-Russian business partnership is out of the question. And it is humanity's great good fortune that the U.S.A. have begun at last to awaken from the Roosevelt narcosis.

But even Joseph Mackiewicz considers the great business partnership as only a very weak venture. This becomes clear as soon as he speaks about the 'course to be adopted in practice for liberating the world from the American-Soviet partnership'. He writes: 'If one is desirous of rendering the activities of a political or business partnership innocuous, the best way of doing it is to break it up from within, i.e., to promote a quarrel between the associated partners.'

It would be a very queer partnership if as an outsider 'one' could hope 'to promote a quarrel between the associated partners'. For, at least, for such hopes to appear justified, the concord must long since have disappeared and quarrelling prevail. That is, the business partnership should be in process of liquidation.

But, as said before, the 'great business partnership' never was anything but a piece of the pitiful Roosevelt-Wallace political theosophy — and this inglorious chapter of recent political history is, unless all indications deceive, in the last stage of its liquidation. There is no longer any place for theosophical phantasies. Matters reveal themselves in their real aspect; as the irreconcilable contradiction between America and Russia, and that means, at the same time, between Western-Democratic civilization and Russian terrorist totalitarianism.

## 2. The irreconcilable contradiction

As opposed to the customary Marxist and quasi-Marxist contentions the irreconcilable contradiction between the U.S.A. and Russia is by no means an economic one in the sense of the known formulation: Capitalism or Socialism. 'Classical' capitalism of the times of the Communist Manifesto has long since become a museum piece; whilst on the other hand, 'classical' socialism has revealed its doubtfulness as a source of bliss and prosperity for all. At present, and for some time already, every western capitalism contains more socialist features than Russia, and imperialist England alone is to-day far more socialist than Russia has ever been since 1917.

Let us therefore leave aside economic fetishism. Happily, the irreconcilable contradiction is a deeper one; it extends into the political and cultural pattern of life of the whole community and the individual way of life of its individual members — contradictions which can broadly be characterized as those between modern democracy and modern totalitarianism. On the one side: complete totalitarianism and systematic terrorism with absolute negation of all social, political, cultural and individual freedoms and guarantees; and on the other side: democratic and individual rights and guarantees which, even with temporary restrictions (e.g., 'licensed democracy') do not abandon the basis of democratic régimes.

And confronted by these two irreconcilably opposed and mutually excluding systems, the question is not which one of the two we 'prefer', nor which one represents the 'lesser evil', but quite simply: *to which do we belong?* Or: which of the two systems accords with our due political and individual rights and guarantees, and which of the two offers us no other perspective but eventual physical destruction, not without first having turned us, in Joseph Mackiewicz's excellent expression, into dirt.



### 3. Bolshevism, Stalinism and Fascism

Are there fundamental differences between Bolshevism and Stalinism? Mackiewicz answers this question in the negative; for him one and the same thing is involved. The editors of *Dinge der Zeit*, however, remark, in a footnote, that they consider such an equation as 'wrong and misleading'.

For a long time the opinion of *Dinge der Zeit* was also my own. However, the whole of the Russian development, the role of Russia in world politics and, finally, a re-study of the basic writings of Lenin have convinced me that Stalinism and Bolshevism (I say it with regret, thinking back to past illusions) are indeed only different names for one and the same thing.

One of the most important features of Leninism (and in my opinion the very kernel) is the conception of the construction, the character and the role of the *Party*. But the Leninist party is a *totalitarian* party. Its aim: the establishment of the totalitarian rule which, according to Lenin, is the concrete form of 'proletarian dictatorship'. Insofar as the Leninist party comes forward as the champion of democracy, it does so solely with the intention of exploiting the democratic demands in favour of its own totalitarian interests and to destroy democracy from within. It is not accidental that 'making use of', 'strategy and tactics', 'cunning and manoeuvring' are among the phrases most used in the Bolshevik vocabulary. The Bolshevik concern for democracy belongs to the sphere of downright demagoguery. Bolshevik interest in democratic freedoms automatically disappears as soon as the Bolshevik party holds power. From this moment the totalitarian tendencies of the party, disguised as 'dictatorship of the proletariat', can develop freely inside the party itself as well as in the whole society.

In Russia this development was initiated by Lenin himself: Stalin is merely its executive.

A totalitarian régime, however, cannot tolerate any 'reforms'. A democratization of the National-Socialist régime in Germany would have meant the downfall of Hitler and the end of National-Socialism altogether, just as a reform of the Stalinist dictatorship would mean the overthrow of Stalin and the end of the rule of Bolshevism.\*

Joseph Mackiewicz's remark that: 'one should rather insult fascism as "black or brown Bolshevism" than the reverse!' can be accepted or denied. Neither in the one or in the other case is it a question of insult, but simply the designation of two phenomena just as in merely speaking about syphilis or scabies no insult is implied. But Bolshevism and Fascism, irrespective of their colour, represent only two shades of the one political phenomenon: modern totalitarianism.

\*In this connection the fate of Trotskyism as a political movement is instructive. The systematic efforts of Trotsky to distinguish Stalinism from Bolshevism and to demand an internal and democratic reform of the Bolshevik Party and of the U.S.S.R., were nothing more than desperate and futile attempts to bridge the inner contradiction of Trotskyism itself: the unconditional defence of Russia as a — degenerated — 'workers' state' and the bitter fight against Stalinism. This inner contradiction firstly prevented the development of Trotskyism into a political mass movement and accelerated by the death of Trotsky, finally condemned it to die away.

#### 4. The war as a way out

'Our readers will realize that we reject "war as a way out",' declare the editors of *Dinge der Zeit* in their foreword to the article of Joseph Mackiewicz.

The war against totalitarian Russia appears to me not only as a 'way out', or perhaps as the most convenient among other difficult ways out but as the sole possible solution of the problem. In other words, in order to prevent the European continent from being plunged into a state of Bolshevik-Asiatic barbarism for generations to come, it is an historical necessity.

There could be several 'ways out' of our political and cultural crisis: the most favourable would be a revolution or a *coup d'état* inside Russia itself, with the aim of removing Bolshevik domination and undertaking a radical democratic reconstruction of the country. Whether in this process private capitalism is reintroduced or not, is of very subordinate importance.

But hopes for a timely revolution or *coup d'état* in Russia belong to the realm of lost hopes, and the way out through an internal Russian transformation to-day has only hypothetical value. As political reality it is still barred. For it to become reality the possibility is not to be excluded that it is precisely the war which can give the necessary impetus to the forces required for a revolution in Russia, and even more: that it represents the pre-condition for the overthrow of the Stalinist dictatorship by a revolutionary uprising. In this respect the German invasion has already furnished some revealing lessons. Though, to be sure, from these it is self-evident that the democratic powers would, in the first place, have to forget thoroughly the Roosevelt-Stalin policy of 'unconditional surrender'.

A second 'way out' would be the preservation of the present *status quo* in the world. Just as the hopes for a timely inner-Russian transformation are Utopian in the absence of a war, so all efforts to retain the *status quo* signify nothing but the political suicide of the democratic forces. The *status quo* could only mean: the further advance of Russian totalitarianism and the further consolidation of its already gained positions, and simultaneously the further passivity and capitulation of the democratic powers. But an intensification of democratic defensive measures, or even an aggressive policy by the western democracies against the claims of the Kremlin, would lead automatically to the end of the *status quo*. At best the Korean example would be repeated at various points of the globe. In any event, intensification of democratic resistance against the expansion of Russian totalitarianism cannot be demanded without at the same time, and in advance, accepting the war as a possibility.

All hopes for an understanding with Stalin are even more illusory than were the hopes for an understanding with Hitler. Every compromise in no way prevents the war, but merely improves the position of Stalin for the war.

Thus the second 'peaceful' way out of the *status quo* is an illusion — and a nightmare at the same time, if one considers that the hopes of enormous masses of people are still directed towards it.

As the last 'way out', only war remains for liberating the world from the permanent Stalinist menace. It becomes more and more clear that the course of the whole international development is in the direction of an

armed conflict. Whether one wishes it or not, the new world war is on the international political order of the day.

### 5. Misleading peace propaganda

Convinced of the unavailability and necessity of a third world war, I agree with Joseph Mackiewicz in his assessment of the peace policy of the democratic powers, empty talk and misleading demagogical optimism.

Democratic governments must naturally take the mood of the people into consideration, and the people are tired of war. However, this will not in any way help them, for the peace illusions will be destroyed overnight. There would be but one extreme remedy to avoid the war and the price would be voluntary submission and the political levelling of all countries to Moscow totalitarianism. It is in every respect an absurd solution — absurd to consider it as a 'solution', and absurd to believe that thereby new sacrifices of life could be avoided. Even with such a phantastic capitulation the war only would be shifted: from the different fronts to the concentration or forced labour camps. The Occident (including everything that belongs to it culturally) would be faced with a depopulation without precedent in world history. This 'peaceful' depopulation would take place systematically in accordance with the party-political requirements and in rhythm with the various yearly and five-yearly plans. Jehovah's witnesses, social democrats, democrats, Trotskyists, Anarchists, Conservatives, Revolutionaries, Liberals, Esperantists and an immense number of those who are nothing at all — all political, religious and other creeds, all communities, parties, sects, factions, groups and societies would be exterminated in one way or another, as organizations and as individuals — not at one stroke, but in the course of a long 'cold' civil war waged by the Stalin apparatus and its party against the population. The victims of this cold civil war would be incomparably more numerous than would be demanded by the third world war. The horrors of the atom bomb and all similar bombs must appear insignificant compared with the mountains of corpses which would pile up as a result of the Stalinization of the world.

The Stalin dictatorship has very well understood that it has still much more to gain at present by a 'peace' based on democratic yielding and war weariness than by an early war. Whereas a war now would question the existing 'conquests' of Russia to date (which were in reality only gifts from Roosevelt), 'peace' at present guarantees their consolidation — up to the time when Russia can take without risk, the initiative of military invasion.

Meanwhile, therefore, Stalin tries to postpone the war. It is characteristic that Moscow's only international propaganda action is the campaign 'for peace and against the atom bomb' — the national and international peace conferences, the 'Stockholm appeal' and the canvassing for signatures throughout the world. Obviously this propagandistic speculation of Moscow's on war weariness and the fear of the atom bomb is an action for undermining and preventing, at the least, ideological preparation for war on the part of the Western democracies. And the gravity of the situation lies in the fact that certainly great masses of people, up against the fateful question 'war or capitulation', still to-day would instinctively prefer the unknown future of a capitulation to the known horrors of a war. This bemused war fear of the masses is at the same time a favourable climate

for the spreading and consolidation of Stalinism. As against this it is the elementary necessity for people of all political and other convictions systematically and vigorously to resist being overwhelmed by the paralysing fear and stupidity of the masses.

But the democratic governments of the West, by also putting into the foreground of their policy the illusory maintenance of peace and a cheap atom bomb pessimism, accommodate to the mood of the population but at the same time render more difficult the necessary armament and resistance of the democracies against Stalinist undermining and against a future Russian invasion. To-day in the Occident, the more the longing for peace and the fear of war take root the nearer looms the Russian invasion. The democratic peace phantasies are part of the preconditions for the creation of a totalitarian Eurasia under the Russian whip.

## 6. Conclusions

The fundamental and irreconcilable contradiction of our time is not the one between capitalism (imperialism) and socialism, but the one between democracy and totalitarianism. The question of property relations at present is of secondary importance as against the question of our entire social situation. The question is whether we are prepared to defend an achieved (the existing one!) political, social and cultural level (which can be reduced to the common denominator Western democracy), or whether we are unprincipled and rotten enough to allow ourselves to be plunged, without resistance, into the barbarism of Stalinist totalitarianism. The alternative is: democracy or concentration camp.

Confronted by such a situation, our task of 'warmongering' is an important one. It is above all, an ideological and propagandistic one: firstly to demonstrate the unavoidability of the war against Russia in the event of the population of the West not being prepared to submit voluntarily to the Asiatic dictatorship of Stalin; and secondly, to convince the partisans of democratic principles of the historical necessity of a war against Russia, i.e. of the necessity for removing by a surgical operation the cancer growth of our globe.

As against the sneaking poison of Stalinist mass deceit and the deadly danger of Russian expansion, the only possible attitude, politically, morally and ideologically for democrats of all shades seems to me to be to acknowledge being a 'warmonger' and to convince friends and opponents of the historical necessity of a war against the present totalitarian and terrorist Russia.

I am convinced that nothing but this war will open up to us and the coming generations the perspective of a peaceful development and of peaceful reconstruction.

## Postscript

My article reached the editors of *Dinge der Zeit* just as number 7 of this magazine came off the press.

The editors sent me the newly published issue across the ocean by air-mail, drawing my attention to the article of Ernst Zander 'War as a way out?' and gave me the opportunity, after reading this article, possibly to correct or supplement mine.

I mention this 'technical' circumstance because the editors' attitude towards me, an opponent in discussion, strikes me as unsurpassably fair, and this also means — really democratic.

I decided to accept the aforementioned invitation in a limited way by formulating some remarks stimulated by the reading of Ernst Zander's article.

1. In the editorial Ernst Zander's position is characterized as that of a 'peacemonger'. But nobody considers the arguments of a peacemonger with more sustained attention than precisely the — warmonger. With great interest I searched in Zander's article for a practicable 'way out', that is, for a convincing proposition of how, in his opinion, the war against Russia could be avoided — and I was disappointed in my expectations.

Ernst Zander sees the key for the 'overcoming of the war' in a 'world economic plan'. In a future discussion article I shall deal with the problems developed in the 'Great Utopia'. For the time being I will deal only with the assertion that a 'world economic plan' undoubtedly can avoid *future* wars and crises, but that the war against Russia or the assault of Russia against the democratic rest of the world will be a reality much sooner than the working out (not to speak of the functioning!) of the plan. And what is more, the question of whether the world will succeed or not in working it out on a democratic basis, is completely dependent upon the result of the war against Russia. The further expansion of Stalinism, or even an international victory of Russian totalitarianism would destroy, for generations to come, every hope of such a plan. A Stalinist world plan, however, after a Russian military victory over the democratic west, would be nothing else but the proclamation of the planned slavery of entire humanity.

2. A second, much more obvious way of preventing the war is mentioned by Ernst Zander where he appeals to the shaven beard of the prophet and proposes: '... that we "shell" North- and South Korea, China, the Russian satellite States and even Moscow with bread, egg-powder, cotton, tobacco, potatoes, tinned meat, dried milk, butter, peanuts, beans, etc., etc., etc.? This glorious and absolutely irresistible war would not only be fantastically cheap and fantastically easy to conduct but that it would also have the following effect we will guarantee by staking our necks without hesitation: the repulsive monster in the Kremlin would be its first victim — with its unleashing he would, in deadly horror, choke on the vodka in his bloody maw.'

This way out, it is true, I have not taken into consideration in my article. But I consider such an offensive by American wealth and plenty as just as ineffective as any other democratic peace offensive. Nothing would prevent Stalinist propaganda from representing this food bombardment as a Moscow success, as an expression of the Western democracies' fear of the irresistible power of Stalin's Russia and as a vile attempt by the capitalist hyenas to corrupt the liberated peoples with a sandwich. All the arguments of 'national honour' would be brought up in order to demand *more* from the imperialist brigands and to prepare more actively for the liberation of the whole world from the 'imperialist warmongers'.

And the masses, after having filled their thus bombarded bellies, would sympathize with the Stalinist policy just as much and just as little as they did yesterday and do to-day, while at the same time on the basis of the

bombardment, they could be convinced sooner of the weakness of the democracies and could more easily than is probably the case to-day, be won over for the 'revolutionary war of liberation'.

Zander mentions, but does not take into account, that the beard of the prophet, with which we are dealing, is precisely a *shaven* beard. The difference is a principled one: even for the prophet with the shaven beard the role of Father Christmas is a flop. And the necks which Ernst Zander so liberally stakes must be put into the category of lost necks.

The food bombardment idea of Ernst Zander's was already conceived by the King of the Aztecs, Montezuma, more than four centuries ago. When he found himself threatened by the invasion of the 'Conquistador' Hernan Cortez, he had the invader met with the most exquisite presents in order to induce him to turn back. The opposite was the result and Montezuma lost both beard and neck. Some few years later Adolf Hitler could be put off neither with Prague Goulash and dumplings nor with Vienna steaks and wine. Besides he was in any case a vegetarian and a teetotaler. But, compared to Stalin, Hernan Cortez was a democrat and Adolf Hitler a pacifist.

Obviously and in spite of everything, Ernst Zander's proposition rests on very serious grounds. I too am convinced of the effectiveness of a tinned meat and dried milk offensive, but only when the political preconditions of its success are given. That is, when it follows in the wake of a military offensive.

3. Ernst Zander considers as justified only the wars of coloured slaves or of enslaved nations against the white man and against the imperialist powers, and wishes them 'overwhelming success'. Elsewhere he repeats, 'it is precisely because it helps to shorten the lifeline of the imperialist powers . . . that the restiveness of the colonial peoples and the oppressed nations has so great a progressive significance for us'.

On the basis of Zander's enthusiasm for the rising of the colonial peoples I would like to supplement my opinion that the decisive contradiction of our time is not the one between capitalism (imperialism) and socialism, but between democracy and totalitarianism by adding that I subordinate each action of national and colonial liberation to the basic contradiction 'democracy or totalitarianism'. In other words, in relation to this basic conflict the colonial conflicts also have lost their traditional significance, at least for the present situation. At present the colonial struggles can be estimated, supported or fought against only by the criterion of whether they help to consolidate and defend democracy or totalitarianism. The whole Chinese national liberation which (in spite of the fact that its success is due in the highest degree to the benevolence of the Roosevelt-conception) serves in Korea to-day as a buffer for Stalin. It lets itself be used to sap the blood and arms of the democratic powers in order to ensure a present delay for Stalin, and as such is not worth a damn. It would be better not only for the future of Asia but of humanity, if instead of Mao Tse Tung and his 'national liberation' an American General were in Peking, and, by the way of a 'licensed democracy', would make China an equal member of international democracy.

The Chinese assault on Tibet only makes the picture clearer. That 'national and colonial liberation' is worthless which makes of itself a lackey of Stalin and at the same time attempts to establish colonies of its own.



E. V. Swart

## WAR AS THE MAIN OBSTACLE

### I

THE discussion on the war was, as our readers will remember, initiated by Joseph Mackiewicz in his article 'I Am Proud to be Called a Warmonger' in number 6 of CONTEMPORARY ISSUES and DINGE DER ZEIT. In the succeeding issue of both magazines Ernst Zander in 'War as a Way Out?' took him seriously to task and, with unequivocal thoroughness, developed our anti-war position. It is not for me to summarize or in any way to restate the substance of his excellent clarification, but one consequence essential in my reply to Fischer emerges from it with terrifying urgency. Another full-scale war will, on the basis of the most up-to-date technological development, so effectively destroy the material wealth and resources of the world, that humanity will be set back to the conditions of barbarism, in the developed countries as well. It is this consequence of yet another war that presents us, as a pioneering movement, and the decisive resistance forces to be called into operation, with the short perspective — how short will appear later — of putting a stop to the war.

The task is naturally not only negative and therefore sharply to be distinguished from pacifism. The overcoming of the war is bound up with the initiation and practice of a world economic plan to overcome universal competition and liberate for humanity's benefit the incalculable technological and productive wealth which is *immediately* available and only withheld tragically by purely artificial profit mechanisms. At the earliest opportunity it is our intention to outline such a plan for discussion and development but, even prior to that, it is possible further to discuss the problem of war and the need to defeat it.

At the outset we must grasp the character of Fischer's contribution as against that of Mackiewicz's. The latter was felicitously described by Zander as 'an illusionist without illusions'. He sees historical development, not as it might have been but as it really is, and he attempts on the basis of sheer repugnance to establish his view. In this way he admits the past and continuing partnership between America and Russia — the decisive feature being that America for the moment needs the totalitarian preparedness of Russia to police the impoverished and unmanageable sections of the world — and in his warmongering he presses for its dissolution. Very well also does he understand the economic impulsion to war — that it is the outcome of the uneasy and critical 'peace' for the elimination of economic rivals. In fact the main fault of Mackiewicz's contribution is that he admits too much. His description of the rôle played by America and the Western 'democracies' in all decisive matters, is so realistic that no consis-

tent person could, with him, choose them as the alternative force for good. His culminating recognition of their utter bankruptcy as 'liberators' reads: 'In spite of all love for their fellowmen, the Western democracies do not wish to lose a single hair for the sake of a neighbour.' Undoubtedly his position is weak — but it is a weakness due to objectivity. The reverse is true of Fischer. He attempts to escape from the catastrophic contemporary development by resort (among other things) to psychological and cultural myths. Apart from his correct *political* characterization of Russia he describes quite wrongly the tenor and content of his article. 'It seems', he writes, 'important to me, not only to express agreement with the confession of being a "warmonger" but, even more, to discuss the "motives" and the train of thought which leads to such a "confession"'. It is not sufficient to agree with the conclusion; the political reasons for "warmongering" are of just as great importance.' But in fact his article is an attempt to dismiss the political and economic course to which the friendly and rival power blocs are committed in order to create a vacuum more or less palatable. By so doing his ardent support of Mackiewicz turns out to be no support at all but a weakening of those sterling qualities praised by Zander. He is indeed an illusionist *par excellence*.

## II.

The portentous ills of the world and war as our inheritance can, as far as Fischer is concerned, be blamed simply on one man — Roosevelt and his 'narrow circle'. In polemicizing against such an historical fiction I have no intention of entering into the furtive, unsavoury deeds — such as Pearl Harbour, etc. — ascribed to this epitome of American Imperialism. Not to be side-tracked by the controversial, it will be enough to reduce to the ridiculous his allocation of the fate of the entire world to Roosevelt. Does Fischer seriously, apart from possible lapses in the nursery, intend us to believe that the whole intricate movement of world affairs can be read on the pulse of one man? Such a conception of history is, though more extreme, on a par with the fascist myth that from a small handful of Jews in secret conclave there flows every abomination. Of course I am aware (very fully in fact) that in his attempt to personalize history his allies are legion. Only the other day the cigar Churchill replacing the umbrella Chamberlain sacrificed the same scapegoat in the British parliament on the question of the unconditional surrender policy for Germany. The idea of a single Atlas holding the world, in modern terms naturally, *down* is unquestionably an official piece of dupery. But does Fischer realize the implications of the idea? His conception of a one-man history which decides the destinies of all Governments and peoples is (even including Hitler and Stalin) the crassest type of dictatorship. The fact that his conception is psycho-analytic, for in it the 'interests of Western democracy' were 'sacrificed' 'to the demands of Stalin's totalitarianism' by the 'infantile illusions' of this one individual suffering from a 'crisis psychosis followed by a war psychosis', and the fact that it is further sweetened by the fruits of philosophy, for he describes the development as 'a piece of the pitiful political theosophy of Roosevelt-Wallace' are embellishments which alter nothing except that they increase the ridiculous. It would thus appear

that we have already suffered a dictatorship over the economy and politics of the world that pales anything of its kind. We may well ask why the author of such a monstrosity supports America in the recommended war against Russia? A society that could allow itself even for a period to be controlled on matters of life and death by a phoney individual is surely no lovely 'guarantee' for the democratic way of life? Or is history merely a series of disconnected incidents? On his own showing there must be something very wrong with the West which, accepting dictatorial methods, succumbs not to the tangibles of slave labour camps and police terror but to psychological derangements in an individual.

But in spite of the Roosevelt myth, relied upon to void history of its unpleasant content, we fortunately find Fischer admitting the partnership between America and Russia which still affects the lives of millions of people. He writes: 'Mr. Roosevelt was undoubtedly incomparably more useful for the consolidation and expansion of Russian imperialism than the whole "cominform" can ever be.' Setting aside the Roosevelt tripe how dead right Fischer is! What unexpected perspicacity! All that is required of me is to supplement it by some facts that he is eager to exclude. While it is true that America (for reasons quite other than Roosevelt's psychology) was the dominant power in all post-war settlements, it none the less remains true that the division of the world was arrived at (Yalta, Teheran, 'unconditional surrender', Morgenthau Plan, Atlantic Charter, Potsdam, etc.) through treaty agreements by *all* the allies in consultation, each driving its own bargain. It only remains to comment on how faithfully and unflinchingly every one of the signatories has carried out the unanimous political policies!

Up to the death of Roosevelt, and in spite of the psychological fuss, Fischer we have seen agrees with us on the collaborationism. But at that point the world, in his devious thinking processes, suddenly ceases to be the same and 'suffers a sea-change rich and strange'. The thoroughly bespattered society, having rid itself of a single demented life, is cleansed. 'It is', he writes, 'humanity's great good fortune that the U.S.A. have begun at last to awaken from the Roosevelt narcosis.' This romantic invention, fantastic as it may seem, is symbolical of his attitude throughout on developments in Western democratic countries, for is it not true that in the same way that the incursions of collaborationism, suicidal to millions of people, are by a fortuitous funeral brought to a halt, so too the inroads into freedoms in the West are halted, and these conceived of as being maintained at a static level? It is in order to defend 'an achieved (the existing one!) political, cultural, and social level' that an immediate war against the East is imperative. It would appear that in the West the 'democratic and individual rights' are 'guaranteed', but how, whether in the form of a 'social contract' or the tablets of Moses, we are not told. We are simply asked to accept his statement that the freedoms, like wages in Britain, are frozen at a certain level, and that wherever 'restrictions' occur like 'licensed democracy', we are assured that these are temporary.

It is difficult to imagine how any man with even a modicum of historical knowledge, and especially Fischer, can induce himself into a position where freedoms are conceived of as being metaphysical entities — that is, as absolutely existing in their own right. Surely Fischer knows that even our

limited existing freedoms had, through the centuries, to be fought for every inch of the road by the ceaseless and clamorous intervention of the masses of the people against their rulers. For his very queer view Fischer has no historical precedents whatever, and I can assure him that the 'restrictions' of our freedoms will prove to be 'temporary', not in terms of the supposed good-will and gifts to the community of those in power, but entirely to the extent to which the masses of the people exert stubborn pressure for the restitution and extension of rights.

### III

For the discussion with Fischer to prove at all fruitful it is essential for us to go more thoroughly than he does into the nature and rôle of the social systems of America and Russia and their existing relations to one another. His arguments for an immediate war, and his conception of America as 'liberator' of the rest of the world, is founded on his assertion, repeated *ad nauseam* throughout his article, that the world is 'confronted by two irreconcilably opposed and mutually excluding systems'. The war is for the elimination of the one and the universalization of the other. If we can prove, theoretically and factually, that the 'irreconcilability', etc., is in no way the case, and that in fact the opposite is true at the moment, Fischer's contribution will be exposed for what it is — a piece of 'war hysteria' faithfully reflecting the propaganda of the national newspapers, bolstered up by a few myths, partaking of totalitarian ideology, and in the final analysis nothing more than the ventilation of personal 'prejudice'. What may at first appear a circuitous method of approach will, I hope, turn out to be an illuminating short-cut.

An understanding of the relationship between America and Russia will remain obscure if we fail to grasp developments inside the latter country and its impulses towards expansionism. While Fischer is right in regarding Russia as an expanding force (though by contrast the supposed *rigor mortis* in the West appears silly), in his eagerness to give battle he falls into the trap of imagining Russia to be stronger than she is. But the reverse is true and America is decisive in all international relations. Of course, this does not mean that Russia does not play a rôle. Her development in fact is most instructive of things to come. It is our view that Russia, the most advanced totalitarian country hitherto known, is the warning prognosis, or mirror if you like, for the development of the rest of the world, for another war will bring the completion of national and international economic exhaustion and collapse with the accompanying totalitarian compulsions.

After her 'victories' in the last world war Russia enters into her imperialist adventures in a manner quite opposite to that of America. Whereas America hits a world market (with productive and purchasing resources further depleted and destroyed by the ravages of two total wars) on the basis of chronic overproduction and is speedily caught up in the contradictions of unsaleable surpluses endemic to capitalism, Russia enters on the basis of chronic underproduction. The (from a political point of view) successful Russian October revolution almost immediately (in all decisive economic respects) succumbed to the fact of its being a revolution

in isolation from the rest of the world.<sup>1</sup> At the time Russia was the weakest link in the capitalist chain and her advanced political development achieved for her an autarchic economy which drives toward retardation and the perpetuation of her backwardness — all Five Year Plans notwithstanding. In the absence of a similar political turnabout in a major European country to create for her an economically advanced ally Russia was concretely and disastrously confronted with her own backwardness and the reversal of the great revolutionary anticipations for progress. In addition, by the alienation of the whole capitalist world (of which the war of intervention was the military expression) Russia was robbed of even the previous slight material alleviations of the crass and brutal feudal conditions attained at the time of the Czar by entry on to an already hopelessly saturated world market through the assistance mainly of French capital investments.

When we remember that the most economically developed sections of present-day society are a result of bitter centuries of accumulated labour in the form of machinery, accompanied step by step, concretely and in every devious detail by technological and scientific achievements, as well as in the form of finance accumulations, and the possibility for the uninterrupted reproduction of labour — when, that is, we grasp the long complicated history of the world emergence from Feudal backwardness — the tasks and the disasters of Russia are properly understood. The fact that in Russia there were a few industrialized areas producing on a high technological level (the working model for the Five Year projects) could not decisively affect her general overall development for they constituted nothing more than small islands in a huge sea of nationalities, and cut off from further aid the strain could only pulverize further.

As if this were not enough Russia enters into world relations at a time when uninterrupted war preparedness and war is the main stream of capitalism, and inherits the drastic embargo which production for destruction places upon production for consumption and material well-being — a disastrous development that is relentlessly driving *backwards* areas of the world even once highly developed like Europe, Japan, etc.

To summarize what has so far been said and to draw some conclusions. In conditions of autarchy, and battenning down on an enormous population labouring in poverty, the development in Russia took the path to the colossal fascist state (with state control of the entire productive life) that confronts us to-day. In its nature it is capitalist and in this not to be distinguished from similar developments in Spain, Italy, Portugal, Germany, and the whole colonial hinterland except that its totalitarianism is

<sup>1</sup> The collapse of the Russian revolution and the ensuing totalitarianism are not to be understood and ascribed to possible errors in the theory of Lenin and Trotsky. Ideas in *themselves* are not decisive. Irrespective of one's estimation of Marxism-Leninism (and we are after all not Marxists) developments in Russia can only be understood *historically* as I have attempted to do in bold outline in what follows. Fischer's failure in this connection makes his position on Lenin quite hopeless. Not only does he make wild statements nowhere backed up but he identifies Leninism and Stalinism, and in this way creates the fallacious impression that Bolshevik parties are still in *existence* to-day undermining democracy in the West. Has Fischer forgotten Stalin's ruthless persecution of the Bolsheviks and their final elimination in the trials of 1936 — to mention only one accompaniment in the establishment of totalitarianism in Russia?

much more extreme. As a commodity society based upon scarcity in the means of production (something that is chronically actual as against what is artificially engendered in more developed countries) it is highly competitive and the economy controlled through statification<sup>3</sup> by a brutal and brutalizing privileged class. The exploitation is all the more intense in so far as it is done in an industrial framework, scientifically, and concentrated almost entirely on production for destruction. Not being able to maintain labour at a reproductive level, through slave labour it eats into the marginal subsistence of the masses.

The moment we recognize Russia as a totalitarian capitalist country the forces that impel toward aggrandisement are immediately exposed. The main impulsions are the capture of manpower ('for the slaves die off daily') by the methods of occupation, the resettlement of populations, kidnapping, etc.; and the feverish plunder through dismantlings, as in Manchuria, Germany, etc., of capital goods to fill up the original hollow in the productive capacity. Russia is the outstanding example of *modern imperialism* (as against that of once progressive capitalism which through large scale exports of capital goods brought industrial development to its Empire), and its expansionism is entirely that of denudation and destruction. It was the first country of any size (for the Hitler adventure came later) to experience the main brunt of the collapse of capitalist relations to be 'solved' by the methods of barbarism. In this development Russia is the harbinger of the fate of the West.

Earlier we said that Russia comes into world relations 'in a manner quite opposite from that of America', but what at the same time must be realized is: that in decaying capitalism (in the actual and threatening collapse of market relations, euphemistically known as the 'gap' ceaselessly swallowing loans but ceaselessly there) the route struck by American economy and that of the West can, in present society, be no different in its outcome from the modern purely destructive totalitarianism. Overproduction in a world of market contractionism drives toward its opposite. It is instructive to watch this process at work in America corroding the teeth of the big gift horse. Or is it purely a linguistic matter Fischer, since in many languages 'gift' means poison?

Already we have in America an enormous stockpile or bottleneck (seven billion dollars) of undistributed and perishable consumers' goods still on the increase. To obviate what has become a public scandal but mainly to short-circuit the process, the Government has guaranteed prices for some agricultural products provided these are drastically reduced. But the planned acreage limitation is naturally only one item underway in the elaborate machinery of statification for the control (read: retardation) of production for consumption. The Defence Production Act of 1950 estab-

<sup>3</sup> This process, already well underway in Britain as well as in other countries and being prepared for on a massive scale in America itself, when re-christened 'nationalization' is viewed by many as progressive and containing the seeds of the peaceful transition to 'socialism'. This is possibly what Fischer means when he writes: 'At present, and for some time already, every western capitalism contains more socialist features than Russia, and imperialist England alone is to-day far more socialist than Russia has ever been since 1917.' If in this vague utterance Fischer has 'nationalization' in mind, I refer him to an article 'British Development and the Common Illusion' by Geoffrey Quilter in No. 2 of CONTEMPORARY ISSUES.



lishes outright the giant structure necessary for complete State autocracy and control over the wealth and life of the nation. 'Under it (*New York Herald Tribune*, 18th December, 1950) the president could curtail civilian production or even close down entire civilian industries.' [My italics — E.V.S.] Is the road to poverty through war clear enough yet Mr. Fischer? Or perhaps for good measure, as an aid to overcoming his *so* exclusive cultural and psychological approach, I should point out (in the same paper of the same date) the effects that the Truman Emergency Proclamation had on the U.S.A. stock exchange (urgent matters these!). It reads: 'President Truman's call for more work, more guns, and more austerity brought an immediate response in the stock market yesterday where prices were whirled up one to four points in spirited trading. Saturday sessions on the stock exchange are usually dull affairs, but not so yesterday.' It is interesting to notice that 'austerity' figures as a prominent goad toward 'spirited trading'.

With the ever-mounting surpluses of consumption goods it is not only Spartan curtailment that is demanded but a turn away from unprofitable ventures to production for destruction. The assurance of 'guns' is the real stock exchange stimulant. The Korean war (an engineered incident if ever there was one) has by Press and propaganda been feverishly used to induce the public to accommodate itself to such a turn and an already enormous war budget has been voted. Armament production is not only the last safe bet for profits but it is the *ideal* for capitalism which has on the basis of threatened plenty outlived its usefulness. Based on war propaganda it ceaselessly appears as a public and inevitable need (to be financed by the public) and its output as ceaselessly disappears only to be continuously renewed in an endless chain of wars — a bottomless pit indeed. The need and the demand carry along with them none of the direct limits imposed upon consumer production in the profit economy. The limits (those of taxation, wage-freeze, political regimentation, etc.) are indirect and are still far from being reached in America.

In schematic presentation the circle of the purely destructive processes on the international scene has been closed, and the development of America and Russia, the two main power blocs, revealed. The development is totally different from that wishfully imagined in the myth-building of Oscar Fischer. Russia is the first on any scale to come up against the features of capitalism in its collapse and America enters as the giant epilogue and is by far the greater of the two evils for with more to destroy the convulsions will be correspondingly greater. Fischer's category of the two as 'mutually exclusive' is altogether mistaken.

He is mistaken in political respects as well. Along with the destructive processes which as we have seen constantly renew themselves, goes the necessary suspension of the most elementary political freedoms. In an accompanying article 'Looking at Lumps' a thorough inventory and survey of the rapidly developing totalitarianism in America has already been made and it remains for me only to fill in a few of the latest details for the process nowhere comes to a stop. In the Emergency Proclamation made by Truman the dictatorial presidential powers appear in monstrous panoply. He has absolute control over propaganda and exchange of opinion lodged in the right 'to seize all radio stations', and control over international travel by the further outright power to seize 'surplus and non-surplus airports and

facilities' and 'the control of shipping'. The more immediate unqualified power over the life of the citizen is guaranteed by those measures affecting conditions of work involving millions. In the newly created Office of Defence Mobilization the President together with Mr. Charles E. Wilson can 'suspend the eight-hour day', institute, as was immediately done in the auto-industry, 'wage freeze', both regulations which strike at the *raison d'être* of the Trade Union movement and its political rights that took centuries to establish — the rights, that is, 'to strike' and of 'collective bargaining'. In Britain similar measures have already led to the declaration and treatment of strikes as 'illegal' and, under the new enactment for 'sabotage', punishable as a criminal offence. Where is the supposed 'political irreconcilability' between Russia and the West?

Fischer's argument that these 'restrictions' must be regarded as only 'temporary' is obvious nonsense not only from a principled democratic point of view but factually. In the issue of the *New York Herald Tribune* already quoted, it is painstakingly pointed out (in the interests no doubt of 'custom' which 'stales') that the new autocratic measures of the Emergency Proclamation do 'not give the President very many powers he did not already possess' for 'the nation is still technically at war, no peace treaty having been signed with either Germany or Japan' — both of which are still being kept *down* in spite of the death of old Atlas! And it itemizes the generalization by stressing one extreme case — that a power as vast as the seizure 'of all radio stations' was established during World War II and never rescinded. An unalloyed example, to go no further afield, of the increasingly permanent character of so-called 'exceptional' suspensions of our freedoms, justified on the basis of the 'war threat' is to be found in England. The thousands of 'emergency' curtailments of the rights of citizens still load the statute-book, have recently been added to, and operate *as law* in, e.g., practically every 'unofficial' strike — and this was the case long before the 'unprovoked aggression' in Korea.

At the same time, while insisting on the decisive tendencies — economic and political — in the era of the death agony of capitalism, it must be observed that America and whole sections of the West are not yet fascist in many respects. We agree with Fischer that the West must be saved for the future benefit of humanity as a whole but this can by no means be done on the basis of warmongering and war. What Fischer utterly fails to realize, and it cannot be insisted upon enough, it being the firm but urgent foundation of our stop-the-war commitment, is that yet another global war will release forces for destruction on the most staggering technological level that will rob mankind of any possibility for the solution of the social questions for an incalculable period. The enormous destruction of human beings, surpassing anything known, however terrifying a prospect, is in no way the major development to be forestalled. Fischer's preoccupation with only this part of the destructive enormity which in his choice of allies he works out cold-bloodedly on the basis of an arithmetic of deaths is not what makes of war the main obstacle. The destruction of the material wealth and the productive resources of the world, that is of the whole basis which brought with it tolerably civilized standards, and the consequent regress to barbarism is the penalty to be paid. His failure to recognize this makes it impossible for him to understand the projected world economic plan.

Happily he can write: 'the question of whether the world will succeed or not in working out a world economic plan on a democratic basis, is completely dependent upon the result of the war against Russia.' The contrary is true. The plan to overcome the purely destructive profit relations, relations which have reached their *cul-de-sac* even in America, still bursting with plenty, can only be put into operation on the basis of what exists at present releasing it for consumption. It is in this way that the task of 'saving the West for the benefit of humanity' presents itself and in which the immediate necessity is to prevent the war. The self-preservative arguments of the warmongers are arguments for our position.

A further reason why Fischer cannot understand the proposed plan is due to the fact that he is not a materialist. The way in which he fumbles with Zander's very serious idea of a food war is a fine example of what happens to any person bent upon cutting history adrift from its economic base. With his example of Hernan Cortes, Hitler, etc., his *determination to misunderstand* is apparent for nowhere was the food bombardment intended for the big chiefs but for the masses of the people labouring in misery. And the result upon which the Prophet was prepared to 'stake our necks' was that 'the repulsive monster in the Kremlin would be its first victim'. Dictatorship and all forms of minority Governments to-day, like those of the West which are only *formally* democratic are based upon ownership in the conditions of scarcity, which they themselves engender and through their 'rule' perpetuate, and any action, like a full scale food bombardment of Russia, something *still* perfectly possible, strikes at the foundations of 'rule'.

\* \* \*

Fischer's better political knowledge (for he is after all no tenderfoot) drives him toward an important and decisive qualification of his reconstruction perspective through war. He stipulates to the democratic 'powers' that, once they have defeated Russia, they 'would have in the first place to forget thoroughly the Roosevelt-Stalin policy of "unconditional surrender"'. But unfortunately he is not serious. He is merely paying lip-service to democracy. On such an immense matter are we concerned only with a little 'mental' event such as having 'to forget'? And how does Fischer propose to struggle for this amnesia? How empty the psychological approach to history! Do we not, in order to take a real pull on our 'faith', require from the 'powers' some immediate concrete demonstrations of their good intentions rather than like Fischer concede them a blank-check for war with a distant post-war guarantee? It would surely be consistent with Fischer's stipulation that he demand now the cancellation of the whole series of 'unconditional surrender' treaties still in operation economically and politically in occupied Germany and Japan — and this in spite of the death of F.D.R. As long as the 'allies' have not fulfilled their liberatory mission advanced as the reason for the last catastrophe is it reasonable to expect them *suddenly* to do so on the basis of yet another? However, not only does Fischer regard this as reasonable but he concurs in the 'surrender' policies of World War II. He complacently accepts 'licensed democracy' (our expression for the state of affairs in Germany to-day), and in addition he flagrantly contradicts his stipulation with regard to the next war for he favours reconstruction in Russia (specifically on the question of food) only

'when it follows in the wake of a military offensive'. In other words he commits himself to the perspective of foreign soldiers as the necessary distributors of consumer goods. How wonderful a liberatory outcome — that yet another country as huge as Russia is to be added to those already under military occupation!

It is a pity Fischer is equivocal about 'unconditional surrender', nevertheless the moment he does accept military 'occupation' which is the heart of the matter he betrays himself as in favour of the totalitarian development of power politics to-day. Does not the recommendation to invade a country in order to bring it under your 'protection' carry with it a very familiar ring? But rest assured, Fischer, the outcome of a War against Russia would be (and including the lip-service to democracy) exactly as you envisage it. No less a person than Dr. Phillip Jessup 'one of the most important advisers of Mr. Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State' said recently that if the United States were to defeat Russia with the atomic bomb the result would be to create 'many new and terribly difficult problems' in the world. 'Even if such action were to be successful in knocking out the Soviet Union it would leave occupation[!] and reconstruction problems of such complexity as to make our present post-war problems look like child's play. And we would have sacrificed the respect and support of other nations.' (*Manchester Guardian*, 28th August, 1950.) Make no mistake — the glorious freedom mission, with or without the atom bomb — would be fulfilled *under* occupation. I leave it to Fischer to figure out the 'complexities' involved in the truly gigantic tasks with a recommendation that he include in it the economic strain on the peoples of the West compared to which similar costs for Germany and Japan would indeed be 'child's play'! Will some kind reader give him the loan of a modern computing machine? I will give him as far as the political strains are concerned the following gift:

'Mr. Kenneth Younger, Minister of State, gave a warning here to-night that a world war against communism might bring the very totalitarianism which the democratic world wanted to defeat. Speaking to the International Students' Association of Harvard University, the leader of the British delegation to the United Nations said that a grave defect of war against communism would be that the cure would be likely to kill the patient almost as surely as the disease.

'He said: "Even if one imagines a third world war in which communism is defeated, it is hard to believe that what would emerge from it would be a free and democratic way of life. The regimentation required for total war effort and the destruction and suffering inevitably caused would be far more likely to drive us into the very totalitarianism which we were fighting to defeat."' (*Manchester Guardian*, 13th November, 1950.)

#### IV.

In rejecting our conception of the *present* 'partnership' between America and Russia Fischer is quite wrong in his argument that this cannot be the case because such a 'partnership presupposes common business interests'. The volume of trade between the West and the East has recently increased quite appreciably. In *The Times* of 25th September, 1950, we read:

'Exports for the United States and eastern Europe were 47 per cent. higher than the monthly average for the first half of 1950, the United States Department of Commerce reports. Exports to the Soviet Union and other east European countries increased from \$9,000,000 in June to \$11,600,000. Imports rose from \$11,000,000 in June to \$12,500,000 in July. Imports from the Soviet Union included furs, manufactured goods [mainly thumb-screws and such like! — E.V.S.], manganese, and chrome.' Included in this uninterrupted and increasing trade are materials directly needed by Russia for the purposes of armaments production, and *The Times* of the 25th of August, 1950, reports: 'Officials at the State Department and the Department of Commerce (Washington) confirmed to-day that inquiries are being made into reports that \$100,000 of molybdenum which was shipped to Britain in May had been subsequently shipped to the Soviet Union.' And as for the Chinese 'enemy':

'The realistic attitude of the Chinese Government in its relations with traders has brought a decided improvement in trade to Shanghai, according to the quarterly review of a British import-export firm.

The review states that a large number of import licences have been issued in recent weeks, accompanied by the grant of foreign exchange to pay for goods. For the first time in two years firms are able to secure orders in fair volume, chiefly for dyestuffs, *steel*, and small tools. A large number of outstanding orders has been cleared, goods for which have been stored in Hong Kong or in Britain.

Previously, owing to the Chinese Government's empty treasury and lack of foreign currency, imports could only be transacted on a barter or link system — exchanging imports for exports. Apparently the Chinese régime is now able to provide ample foreign exchange.' (*The Times*, 31st October, 1950.) [My italics — E.V.S.]

These are merely a few items in the long inventory that could be made on the question of the economic interests in common between the present 'rivals to the death'. But the trade relations must not be regarded as decisive in the existing partnership. Fischer, in the final analysis that is, is right when he asserts that the relation 'between the U.S.A. and Russia is by no means an economic one'. The slave society in Russia is on such a low productive level that, compared to the volume of world trade, it does not offer America and the West an extensive market. A check on this matter is now made possible through the publication recently by the Statistical Office of the United Nations of comparative national income statistics of all the leading nations including, for the first time, the Soviet Union. The tabulations are as follows:

'National income in 1949 U.S. dollars

U.S.A.	...	...	...	...	216.8 billion
United Kingdom	...	...	...	...	38.9 billion
Total U.S. and U.K.	...	...	...	...	255.7 billion
U.S.S.R.	...	...	...	...	59.5 billion

A comparison of relative defence expenditure is now possible on the basis of these figures. During 1949-50 the defence expenditure of the United States and the United Kingdom was approximately 10 per cent. of their combined national income — that is, about 25 billion dollars.

Mr. Shinwell in the defence debate last July said that Russia's defence

expenditure was "not less than 13 per cent. of her national income" (*Hansard*, 26th July, col. 471). The Soviet Union's defence expenditure during the same period would have been eight billion dollars as against 25 billions of the United States and the United Kingdom. If China and the satellites are added to the account on the Soviet side, and the North Atlantic Treaty countries on the other, the eastern bloc's deficiency becomes even more pronounced.' (From a letter by J. Kimche, Esq., to *The Times* of 11th December, 1950.)

This low productive capacity naturally has its repercussions on prices. In the *New York Times* of 21st December, 1947, we find the following comparisons. In investigating the 'new schedule of prices in zone 1 of the Soviet Union' it was estimated that for a loaf of bread the 'urban Russian factory worker' would have in terms of his 'average earnings' to work 24 minutes more than an equivalent worker in an American factory and the additional *extra* time to be worked for other basic necessities would be as follows: for a quart of milk 24 minutes, for a pound of tea 10 hours 20½ minutes, for a man's suit three weeks, and for a woman's house dress 31 hours 29½ minutes. With such an enormously inflated price level it is obvious that Russia cannot enter to any great extent into import-export relations at 'competitive prices' with the U.S.A.

It is precisely due to the fact (something Fischer fails to realize) that the economic relations with Russia can in their nature be only very limited or, to put it differently, because America can be almost entirely indifferent to Russian competition on the world market that her supposed 'fear' of Russian expansionism and an 'immediate' war against the 'aggressor' must be regarded *at the moment* as purely ideological and meaningless — used by the inventors of public opinion to justify morally the (as we have seen) imperative drive toward armament production. In support of what I have said it must not be forgotten that the Empire-building allowed to Russia through the various treaty agreements has been on the whole in areas extremely backward industrially and which at no time have constituted a competitive economic danger to the U.S.A. It is interesting to notice that in the global shareout after World War II America allowed no interference from any ally with her outright occupation of industrially developed Japan and that Russia's share of Germany was the mainly agricultural section.

Considered in terms of international developments and relations, it is palpably clear that those between America and Russia supplement each other, and even from the economic point of view there are no immediately 'irreconcilable contradictions'. Make no mistake, the war clamour against Russia is purely propagandistic hiding other propulsions. This does not of course mean that an eventual war between America and Russia is ruled out. The giant economic problems in America press through in the direction of war as indeed do the brutal requirements of Russia. But the tremendous difficulty which confronts the *real* warmongers, those in power as against scribes like Fischer, is the increasing unmanageability of the impending developments. Unlike Germany, which brought to its militarism an enormous productive potential, Russia is far too weak in world development to be able to participate immediately and to sustain for any length of time the strain of a global war; and America is still far from the political preparedness for so enormous a collapse. For quite some time yet the American



armaments production programme shall have to realize and renew itself on engineered incidents in the Far East, in Germany and elsewhere. While we must ceaselessly expose and oppose the 'incidents', nevertheless the development allows a perspective for sustained propaganda and actions to overcome the final catastrophe, not as short as it might appear from the noise of the ideologists.

Russian gains have indeed been mixed victories. While such expansion in some of the most densely populated areas of the world suits her insatiable requirements for slave labour and, while it did allow her limited industrial gains through dismantling, it at the same time drives her toward the acute political problems of an Empire over-extended on the basis of poverty. True enough Russia has, since the counter-revolution, had time enough to develop the most elaborate totalitarian machinery and therefore has at her command massive resources of brutalized human material for battenning down on the world's many bald spots — fascist supplies that the rest of the world between them could not muster for the job. And in this fact we strike the trail of the real 'partnership' between Russia and America. Fischer knows very well that we have at all times stressed the partnership as, in its decisive respects, political and not economic. In the general and continuing collapse of market relations the latecomers to the development of capitalism (always troublesome and handled in the past by limited economic, military, police and other means) are now utterly unmanageable and have to be policed on a scale for which America is not yet prepared — though, as we have seen, the preparation of the necessary totalitarian means is feverishly being pressed. In these processes it must be understood that while it is America's good luck that Russia has the *political preparedness* for the immediate post-war mess, she is none the less too impoverished herself to be entrusted with the task of effective oppressor for any length of time.

It is Russia's great economic weakness that contributes toward setting the *pace* for fascism in America. Already cracks in the structure are exposing themselves in the Korean incident. Reports increasingly filter through of the insufficient and shoddy arms used by the North Koreans: 'The prisoners [Chinese] said the arsenals in Mukden and Harbin are producing imitations of American shells, but that for lack of technical knowledge, one fifth of the shells produced are duds.' (*New York Herald Tribune*, 18th November, 1950.) In a recent speech of Tito's (quoted *Daily Express*, 29th December, 1950) we are told 'of the shoddy weapons that Yugoslavia had bought from the Russians. Two hundred and twenty 85 mm. anti-aircraft guns were simply reassembled from various guns, even though they were supposed to be new. A certain number of 76 mm. Zis anti-tank guns were not new, but old, only repainted just prior to delivery. Tanks were simply reconditioned, not new. Even spades were of such poor material that they bent when they were used.' And elsewhere we are apprised (unfortunately the cutting is not to hand) that one in ten of guns produced and supplied by Russia to the North Korean Army have injured soldiers firing them and are mass-produced in a most elementary and cheap manner. Animal transport is used on an ever-increasing scale, and manpower recklessly squandered on the basis of light arms.

In spite of the weakness of Russia war, in the absence of a previous revolt

of the people, is, as we have already defined it, an 'historical necessity'. It is true Fischer uses the term, but my objections are to the actual content he gives to it and are two-fold. In the first place, in his anxiety to cut history loose, relegating economics and politics to a twilight zone, we are left with yet another myth. He would have it that war between the East and the West is not a question to be decided in terms of 'which one of the two we "prefer", nor which one represents the "lesser evil" (choice) but quite simply: *to which do we belong?*' Are we to understand by this metaphysical jingle that there is some mysterious sense of 'belonging', not only above our economic and political life, but beyond individual 'preference', choice, etc.? How is the blindly operating force driving toward war to be described — in terms of 'race', 'Kultur', etc.? At all events, and quite apart from how we attempt to label the mystery, to the extent that it is above choice, it is, we repeat, clearly not an individual matter so that wherever he recommends the frozen West as based upon individual rights, etc., he is the Laocoon to his own 'historical necessity'.

But my main objection is in terms of a consequence flowing from what I have so far said about the requirements of Fischer's 'necessity'; and in describing it the distinction between the static and the dynamic approach is further illustrated. Leaving out, as it does, 'accident' (to use the philosophical term), in this case 'choice', it is an 'historical' process purely mechanistic and can in the social life only lead to dissipation of the self, disillusion, and fatalism. In fact the purely negative result of Fischer's mystique is well expressed by himself when he writes: 'Whether one wishes it or not, the new world war is on the international order of the day.' It is the 'la, la' of T. S. Eliot, and the more finely expressed but, as hopeless, attitude of Hardy in the 'd'Urbervilles': 'The President of the Immortals has finished his sport with Tess.' (Poor Oscar!) In the realm of politics it is nothing other than the capitulation to every iniquity, outright bankruptcy; and, in this, it is not those who resist but Fischer himself who is 'rotten'. But to return. Every conception of 'necessity' which does not include and allow for 'accident' becoming, under definable conditions, itself 'necessity' is deterministic (what Fischer in another connection objects to as 'fetishistic'). In politics it is precisely 'choice' (determined and intransigent) on the part of 'individuals' in free association and with a common purpose that can put a stop to (pioneering, of course, masses in motion) and overcome the purely *negative* aspect, for this is what in decisive directions the 'necessity' of capitalism is in its collapse. In such development it is 'accident' radiating outwards in understanding and actions which in molecular fashion establishes itself as 'quantity' and therefore as *positive* 'necessity'. On the other hand, of course, 'necessity' can itself become 'accident'.

Nowhere in his article does Fischer use the high-sounding terms that appear in its title without contradiction, mystification, or with any precision. He does no more than confront us with a 'history' that is a projection and generalization of his own entirely private wishes. Necessity with him means no more than what is 'desirable'. He wishes on world society another war and he 'desires' that the West shall win. In attempting to bolster up this simple position his myths add nothing but logical errors. In fact he himself knows that the generalization of his point of view and

its supposed inevitability, entirely lodged above the realm of what we 'prefer', is a falsification. He is chagrined by the *fact* that 'the hopes of enormous masses of people' are directed toward peace, which for him constitutes a nightmare.

War Fischer is the nightmare! In this stage of the decline of world relations it has nothing whatever left that can be considered progressive. In order to help you wake up and see things with open eyes the most recent political developments in and connected with the Korean 'war of liberation' come as an aid. We note. Syngman Rhee, the notoriously corrupt big chief of a corrupt government before the outbreak of 'hostilities', about whom *The Times* in a sedate leader was forced to admit that 'his credentials and record even in the South are by no means of the best' (17th November, 1950), has been reinstated for the 'liberatory' work you wish on the world. This he has begun by extensive resort to police methods, firing squads, mass murders, etc., and naturally nobly supported by the best (though unfortunately most contradictory) excuses on the part of the democratic Press of the West. On the one hand we read about 'the mass executions by shooting' which (what a wonderful Christmas gift!) 'Mr. Rhee's Government has agreed to abandon' (*Daily Herald*, 23rd December, 1950) that the executions were not the fault of American Military command because Korea 'is a sovereign republic' 'and so far as the republic follows its own laws nobody can interfere' (from a statement by Lieut.-Col. John P. King, American Adviser (!) to the Korean Army Judge Advocate, (*The Times*, 19th December, 1950) and, on the other hand, in the same paper for 17th November, we are informed that in so far as 'the greater part of North Korea has been conquered [!] not by the South Koreans but by the United Nations' the Government of Dr. Rhee can claim 'no right of conquest' and is 'the *de facto* administration of Northern Korea, under the shelter of the *United Nations occupation* [!]' [My italics — E.V.S.] How truly confusing though naturally not for the Koreans, to whom the iron heel of the Rhee administration, whether 'sheltered' or not, is unambiguous.

But even outside Korea the purely destructive features involved in all totalitarian wars (and this in spite of the deliberate confusionism and hysteria) has begun to appear with a nastiness. The authorities have had to resort to another totalitarian political measure for the West (an illustration that in world social processes nothing is hermetically sealed!) and have placed a censorship on news which 'requires that all news articles, broadcasts, and photographs relating to Korean military operations must be submitted for clearance to a headquarters Press advisory [!] division'. (*The Times*, 21st December, 1950.)

We must not allow the phrase 'military operations' used as justification

<sup>1</sup> When in this respect he speaks about 'the stupidity of the masses' (no one is denying that, through no fault of their own, they are 'ignorant' which is quite another matter) he again reveals the totalitarian streak in his thinking on world problems. It is well known that such repulsive baggage is the justification used by every self-appointed little *avant-garde* for its *aristocratic* political and other attitudes. Fischer carries this inimical attitude further when he advocates war irrespective of the wishes of the people. In other words, he is in favour of dictating war and has at the same time the temerity to dub such a war 'democratic'. But it is Fischer who is 'stupid' and not the 'masses'. In their desire to protect themselves against the horrors and destruction of yet a third world war they have in their inchoate way made an important historical recognition.

for world censorship of the Press to influence us — for everything in Korea comes under that category. Have not the new war 'laws' in Korea, which have as their consequence the very atrocities in question, mass executions of men, women and children, etc., precisely a 'military' justification? This second Christmas gift conveniently prompt to cover up the other must be recognized for what it is: the glorious 'allies' have contributed to the freedom-loving world yet another iron-curtain country. Liberation in Korea, like 'socialism' in Russia, is an adventure that can not in all its grandeur be exposed to the rest of the benighted world.

In expecting 'recent political developments' to aid Fischer to 'open his eyes', I am perhaps after all, a benighted optimist. In the postscript to his article his previous veiled support of occupation, provided it is carried out not by the East but the West, is stated in more outright fashion. 'It would be better', he writes, 'not only for the future of Asia but of humanity, if instead of Mao Tse Tung and his "national liberation" an American General were in the saddle in Peking, and if China would become an equal member of international democracy by way of a "licensed democracy".' How, in such a statement, he can have the effrontery to speak about a nation robbed of national self-determination which is the basic precondition for 'freedoms' (which historically came about precisely through such determination) and at the same time speak of its being 'an equal member of international democracy' is unimaginable! However, one thing is clear. His choice is merely between two rival totalitarianisms. His statement on China gives the lie quite nakedly to his reiterated assertion that the choice is between 'democracy' and 'totalitarianism'.

With that we arrive at the deceptive heart of Fischer's article. In his choice democracy is equated, not with the elementary human freedoms that are to be its content nationally and internationally, but with his favoured 'western' oppressors. In the postscript his statements on the colonial struggles in general make it quite clear that he does not care a damn for the millions of totally unfree peoples living under foreign domination in the most abject conditions but only for the welfare of the dominators. He writes that 'the colonial struggles can be estimated, supported or fought against only in so far as they help to consolidate' (and here we interrupt the quotation to substitute for the word 'democracy' which follows) '*their existing Governments*'. The substitution (to combat duplicity) is essential for the simple reason that the 'democracy' to be 'consolidated' does not exist for the millions of coloured peoples in the colonies under Western rule. His position is not only historically wrong-headed but brutal. He cynically expects those dispossessed in the most crass and inhuman manner to support in their struggles only the aims and interests of their dispossessors — to hand themselves over loyally, that is, to the very source of their ruin. Surely the stipulation for 'colonial struggles' of what I have called the 'loyalty' condition can only mean an end of *their* struggles and, for Fischer to write about them at all, is the purest hypocrisy. In his conception, not only have they lost what he lightly calls their 'traditional significance', but every vestige of their great 'human' significance. On this, as on all important matters Fischer has with admirable largesse handed the world over to the devil and his dam though naturally under another name — and in doing this he has chosen totalitarianism.

Paul Mattick

## THE KEYNESIAN INTERNATIONAL

Although we are not in agreement with some of the points made by the author in the following article, he touches on the question of the 'inner limits' of capitalism, which is an important problem and which we hope will be further discussed in a future number.

### I

ANTICIPATING America's role in the wake of the first world war, President Wilson encouraged his fellow-citizens in 1916 by saying that 'we must play a great part in the world whether we chose it or not. We have got to finance the world in some important degrees and those who finance the world must understand it and rule it with their spirits and with their minds'. The simple message he had to bring, he added, was merely this: 'lift your eyes to the horizon of business.'<sup>1</sup> His anticipations were fulfilled beyond all expectations. The war destroyed Europe's dominating position within the world economy and the United States turned from a debtor into a creditor nation. America's rise to supremacy continued uninterrupted, and out of the second world war she emerged as the world's sole creditor. But though her 'eyes are still lifted to the horizon of business', and though in business terms America indeed rules the world, its profitability is questionable and its future insecure.

With the 'end' of the second world war and in view of the vast devastation of both Europe and Asia, the revival of the disturbed world economy became America's responsibility. However, United States aid to the outside world was still conceived in business terms. Despite America's persistent favourable balance-of-trade throughout the inter-war years, it was still held possible that an international trade equilibrium could 'be re-established through international lending and investments. In Alvin H. Hansen's opinions of 1945, for instance, unceasing American loans would not only secure full employment at home but may lead to such a general expansion of capital as to allow for repayments and interest. 'If we manage our own affairs reasonably well,' he wrote, 'if we enter into international co-operation on international monetary and financial arrangements, and if the foreign loans are invested in productive and useful projects, then it is reasonable to suppose that over a long-run period the interests and amortization charges can be paid. They will be relatively small in proportion to total international transactions and can quite easily be managed in a reasonably stable and prosperous world.'<sup>2</sup>

This cheerful statement based itself on the unrealistic hope that 'the rise of Russia on one side of the globe and the economic and military power of the United States on the other, . . . presents a new basis for world security

<sup>1</sup> *Wilson Papers*, Vol. IV, pp. 229-233.

<sup>2</sup> *America's Role in the World Economy*. Penguin ed., p. 136.

and peace',<sup>3</sup> and on the projection of Keynes' unproven monetary theory of capital expansion from the national to the international scale. The illusion of a continued American-Russian co-operation within the framework of the United Nations was soon shattered, however; not a lasting peace but the 'cold war' followed the defeat of the Axis powers. Not the desired integration of the world economy but inescapable power politics determined America's lending policy, the outright grants, and Marshall Plan aid. It is hoped, of course, that these 'emergency steps' will incidentally help strengthen the necessary trend towards a world-trade equilibrium, and that the seemingly unprofitable subsidies of to-day may yet become to-morrow's profitable business. But thus far, they have led only to new 'emergency steps' in a consistently disintegrating world economy.

Testifying in behalf of the European Recovery Programme, Secretary of State Dean Acheson pointed out, that in order to maintain the volume of American exports which the free world needs, it would be necessary to allow for European imports, to invest American capital, to grant loans, and to continue to give gifts. 'It is in the carrying out of such a policy, and in our determination . . . to do it however long it takes and whatever it requires of us,' he concluded, 'that the frustration of the Kremlin's design for world dominion lies.'<sup>4</sup> Of the ways mentioned to maintain the required volume of American exports, only the last is of immediate significance. This was made clear by Paul G. Hoffman, who stated, that 'by 1953 the Marshall-plan countries will barely have their noses above water' and that 'no substantial improvement can be expected for the next decade'. He felt, 'that it will take fifty years for Europe to come back to where she can buy and pay for what they need from us and service already existing loans'. To ask Europe to accept aid in the form of additional repayable loans, he considered an 'immoral act', as such loans could never be collected. Far from despair, however, Paul Hoffman pointed out, that the second world war 'will have cost the United States \$1 trillion 300 billion before it is finally paid for', in view of which the Marshall aid expenditure necessary to avoid another war, 'will turn out to be the greatest bargain the American people ever had'.<sup>5</sup>

The political and economic relations between the American and the European Continent, represent only one aspect of the power problems besetting the world. There is the question of Asia, of the backward countries in general, with which United States policy must concern itself. Here, however, America has met with little or no success. No Marshall Plan welds the Eastern nations to the United States, no Pacific pact matches the Atlantic pact. Loans and direct aid could not stem the 'liberation' movements which terminate in the Russian power bloc. Apparently, the war in the Pacific yielded nothing; the whole of Asia, even more than the rest of Europe, remains contested ground over which new wars will probably be fought. To escape these wars, President Truman offered yet another 'bargain' to the American people by initiating the so-called 'Point Four' programme for technical assistance and general aid to economically under-developed countries.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>4</sup> *The New York Times*, 22nd February, 1950.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.



Being President, however, and therefore budget-conscious, Mr. Truman outlined his programme in a limited form and in business-like fashion. Suspected of harbouring 'socialist tendencies', he stressed the need for the outflow of private investments beneficial to backward nations. To accelerate such endeavours, he recommended that the 'Export-Import Bank be authorized to guarantee United States private capital . . . against the risks peculiar to those investments', such as the 'dangers of inconvertibility', and the 'dangers of expropriation'. Although Mr. Truman made it clear 'that the development of under-developed economic areas is of major importance in our foreign policy', he forestalled all possible accusation of fostering 'dollar diplomacy' by suggesting the closest co-operation between the United States, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the United Nations Organization in the execution of the programme.

The Administration's 'Point Four' proposals were criticized because of their narrowness and stinginess. This is no field for private investments, it was said, as the conditions in Europe and Asia do not attract private capital despite all guarantees. The whole project was too insignificant to affect the miserable living conditions in backward areas. It should be enlarged, should encompass more territory and release greater activity; it should be government-financed, and carried out in a true spirit of internationality. James P. Warburg, for instance, saw in the Administration's proposals just another example of America's 'bargain-basement diplomacy', in which the 'immaturity' of her foreign policy manifests itself. He pleaded for the extension of the 'Point Four' programme far beyond the considerations of its originators, and for its integration with the Marshall Plan, so as to yield a broader plan of world-wide reconstruction and development. Because America has at present 'about twenty billion dollars a year of excess productive capacity to use in the implementation of her foreign policy', Warburg suggested a huge programme of capital exports designed to 'build up the purchasing power of the other nations of the world to a point where, eventually . . . the dangerous gap in America's balance of payments will be eliminated'.<sup>6</sup>

Foreign aid, in Mr. Warburg's opinion, must be more than 'merely another instrument in the existing negative power struggle'. In the words of the President, it must really 'help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens'. Only thus will they be enabled to combat 'false doctrines' and to defend the democratic way of life. Out of other considerations but in the same vein, Senator Brien McMahon, in speaking on the problems of the hydrogen bomb, suggested a yearly expenditure of ten billion dollars for five years, for the 'Point Four proposals, the development of atomic energy everywhere for peace, and general economic aid and help to all countries, including Russia'. By such a policy, he said, 'we would have probably saved mankind from destruction by fire, and we would have paved the way toward a new era of unimagined abundance for all men, based upon atomic energy constructively harnessed'.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *Point-Four: Our Chance to Achieve Freedom from Fear*. New York, 1949, p. 36.

<sup>7</sup> *Inaugural Address*, January, 1949.

<sup>8</sup> *The New York Times*, 3rd February, 1950.

On the other side of the Atlantic, on the receiving-end so to speak, an even greater optimism supports the spending policy. Not thinking in terms of war, and assuming a full European recovery through American help, Ireland's foreign minister Sean MacBride, for instance, envisioned a coming situation in which both Europe and America, in order to maintain full employment, will be forced to disencumber themselves of chronic over-production by way of some form of peace-time lend-lease and the periodic cancellation of international credit balances. He proposes the sending of all surpluses to the world's under-developed areas; a project to be financed by a gigantic American-European joint investment pool. 'Surplus output,' he said, 'should never be considered a problem as long as people in any part of the world are underfed and living in subnormal conditions, until, as Keynes has been quoted as saying "the last Hottentot owns a Rolls-Royce car".'

## II

The unrealistic thinking here recounted, which tries to make an economic virtue out of the political necessity to support and stabilize the non-bolshevik world, can serve as no more than an apology for the current subsidizing practices. Although they are supplemented here and there by direct military aid, financial means of control are still of major importance to the Western nations. Authoritarian methods of control are available only to a limited degree under the exceptional circumstances of occupation and war. Otherwise, as Dean Acheson has pointed out, 'We do not intend, nor wish, in fact we do not know how, to create satellites'.<sup>9</sup> The strict political integration that characterizes the Russian relationship to her satellites, where the latter's governments are merely extensions of the Moscow government, presupposes a totalitarian outlook, terroristic methods of control, and determination towards a complete integration of the various economies into the centralistically-directed Russian autarchy. All that the United States can at present do in controlling other governments, or in influencing their policies, is to offer or to deny further material and financial aid.

Degrees of collaboration and control are thus determined by the various national needs and their urgencies, and by the means available for foreign aid. While the needs of the nations are unlimited, the material and financial means are not. This is one of the reasons why American aid finds many objectors, who try either to cancel it, or to cut the unavoidable expenditures down to a minimum. The arguments against extensive foreign aid are based on the competitive or monopolistic needs of some industries, on the traditional ideology of a balanced budget, on the demand for lower taxes as an incentive for private investment, on the fear of a strong government *vis-à-vis* the business interests, on the illusion of a possible retreat into a new 'isolationism', and often merely on the aversion to play Santa Claus on other than the Christmas days.

These arguments indicate actual and imagined discrepancies between 'social' and 'private' interests or, rather, between the business interests and the national needs as interpreted by the government. To compromise the varying interests is supposedly the function of democratic government, or

<sup>9</sup> *The Statist*, London, 10th December, 1949.

<sup>10</sup> *The New York Times*, 17th March, 1950.

*vice versa* the compromise is thought to constitute government policy. In its broad outlines and basic direction, of course, foreign policy is determined rather by the long-run needs of national security and national growth, than by the shifting power constellations of various pressure groups at any particular time. Still, the manner in which the 'general line' is maintained, is to some extent dependent upon the changing fortunes in the internal political struggles, which result at times in contradictory decisions.

With regard to foreign policy, to be sure, the government already enjoys a large degree of independence, enabling it to follow an elected course of action to its end. But it does not possess the unhampered authoritarian manoeuvrability given to the Russian adversary. It must still ask for funds, and its demand may not be granted. Assuming then that America's expendable funds were as large as they are thought to be by those who want to finance world peace, their unimpeded distribution to this end would presuppose the existence of an omnipotent government. Short of this, their actual employment will depend upon the distribution of influence and power as between government and business within the government and within the business world.

The artificiality of the question 'to spend or not to spend for world security and peace', is brought to the fore by the fact that the surplus output of the United States, and the hoped-for surplus production of a revived Europe, are quite insignificant when compared with the actual human needs in the under-developed areas of the world. They are even small when compared with the actual needs in Europe and America. There would not be much surplus output in the United States for some time to come if the needs of the low-paid sections of the population were given consideration, if slums were abolished and working conditions humanized. Whatever surplus production there is, does not suffice to mitigate to any noticeable extent the near-starvation or actual famine conditions under which the bulk of humanity exists. But even if the surplus output could be raised so as to become an effective weapon against the poverty that endangers the peace, it cannot be expected that a 'share-the-wealth-plan', while rejected at home, would find application on the international scene.

Help is offered, therefore, only to those 'willing to help themselves', that is, to nations capable of development and ready to support a 'free' world economy. To initiate their capital formation and, eventually, to partake in the resulting rewards, are the economic reasons advanced in support of the political considerations of the foreign aid programme. The alleviation of human misery is seen as the by-product of a larger output and a greater productivity in the backward regions; the pump-priming policy of the depression years is to be applied internationally. But not with the optimism and abandon of the earlier national schemes of government-financing, which had been based upon its assumed 'multiplier effect' on consumer spending. Although pump-priming in under-developed nations requires not only monetary means but also technical assistance, Dean Acheson made bold to say that 'the remarkable thing about this kind of help is that you can get big results by making a comparatively small outlay of dollars for the services of skilled people'.<sup>11</sup> Even before any type of help was actually mobilized, he assured the American people that American aid would not build large mills,

<sup>11</sup> *The New York Times*, 31st March, 1950.

mines, and factories, but would merely support an educational programme designed to teach the people in the under-developed regions to do things for themselves. This form of aid, of course, is not a practical solution for the problems besetting the backward nations in 'terms of food, shelter, and a decent livelihood', but solves at most the employment problems of some Americans hunting for jobs abroad. And even this is questionable, as the technical 'know-how' without the technical 'wherewithal' is quite superfluous.

### III

The meagre suggestions of Government, Congress, and Senate with regard to American aid under 'Point Four' justify the accusations of insincerity and lack of understanding brought forth by those proposing a global Marshall Plan. Their own 'generosity', however, is as inapplicable as the 'realistic' government-programme is meaningless. In the first place, there is the difficulty of raising the funds necessary to finance the peace of the world in an economy in which no one, and no institution, has at any time superfluous funds, where at all times all fight for a larger share of the national income whatever its size. But aside from this, the immediate pressures of the prevailing power struggles within the nation, among the nations, and between the two dominating power blocs, exclude the adoption of a world-wide welfare programme for the abatement of the social and imperialist frictions that drive the world towards war.

England's prosperity, for instance, depends upon overseas supplies of essential foodstuffs and raw materials. Engaged in an attempt to regain her former exchange position, she can hardly share the enthusiasm for the industrial development of the backward areas. In fact, she cannot help but sabotage such endeavours, since 'anyone familiar with the present compelling desires of under-developed primary producing countries to industrialize and to turn to the domestic production of manufactures will realize the special dangers which now confront the balance of payments of a country in England's position'.<sup>29</sup> A real concern for the backward nations would be strange, indeed, at a time when the highly-developed industrial enemy-nations are turned into under-developed areas with a great amount of unemployed 'know-how'. At the first sign of a revival of Japan's industry, 'the cotton manufacturers of Great Britain . . . called upon American mill operators to join in an effort to limit Japan's activities . . . American shipping operators, fearing the effects of a resurgent Japanese merchant marine, are for preventing the reopening of world shipping to Japanese vessels'.<sup>30</sup> And this notwithstanding the alleged preoccupation with the increase of world production and with the extension of world trade, and notwithstanding Japan's damaged and worn-out industrial equipment, her paucity of natural resources, her 80 million population in a decreased area, unable to feed themselves save by increasing industrial exports. This attitude contradicts the current propaganda for a general betterment of living standards. It made no sense to Senator McCarran, for instance, who wondered about the 'senseless policy of destruction of German industrial facilities' and the 'enforced paralysis' of the German economy. 'Destroying

<sup>29</sup> J. E. Meade, *Planning and the Price Mechanism*, New York, 1949, p. 111.

<sup>30</sup> *The Oriental Economist*, Tokyo, 21st May, 1949.

steel plants in Western Germany,' he said, 'and then using American dollars to erect them elsewhere is shortsighted — a useless expenditure of United States money'.<sup>14</sup> As we have learned from Dean Acheson, however, 'steel plants' are not in the 'Point Four' programme, so that 'elsewhere' can only mean the Western nations allied to the overall strategy of the 'cold war'.

The American-Russian power conflict commits the United States to the attempt to secure the continuation of Western Europe in its present socio-economic form. This implies the propping-up of the West-European nations and the support of their policies *vis-à-vis* vanquished Germany. It implies both the Morgenthau Plan and the Marshall Plan. As Germany cannot be revived without altering the existing power relationships, all revisions of the Morgenthau Plan required a relatively greater strengthening of the Atlantic-pact nations. But no real European revival is possible within the setting of the 'cold war' and without a full regeneration of the German economy. American aid to Western Europe can therefore not be terminated, despite the time-limit set to the Marshall Plan. This is the dilemma of a victory which destroyed one aspirant for world rule only to raise another.

Of all American aid in the post-war years about 90 per cent. went to Western Europe. With the accentuation of the conflict between the 'East' and the 'West', little aid will be given the backward areas. This miserliness finds its reason not only in the need to concentrate upon the urgencies of the moment, but also in the difficulty of fitting the backward regions into the American strategy. In the divided world of to-day, there is no independent way for the under-developed nations to partake in world affairs. They must line up with either one or the other of the power blocs. They cannot choose freely between competing social systems, but are subjected to internal and external pressures often inexpressible in terms of dollars and cents. It will therefore not do, to ask the Chinese 'people' to compare the Russian credit of 'no more than \$45,000,000 per year' with the American 'grant — not loan — of \$400,000,000 . . . in the single year of 1948',<sup>15</sup> in order to convince them of the unreasonableness of their choice of allies. It is not Russian economic aid that turned China 'communist', but the Russian success in the last war. There simply is no other power in China's proximity able to counterbalance Russia's new influence in Asia. Neither will it do to point to the 'lack of any sign of a great programme of industrialization' and to surmise that Russian policy intends 'to make China's economy more "colonial" than before, so that it can provide foodstuffs and raw materials for the new industrial areas of Siberia'.<sup>16</sup> For whether this is so or not is quite beside the point, as it is now Russia's turn in Asia. And Russian imperialism incorporates the Asiatic 'liberation' movements, and the attempts to 'revolutionize' their economic life along state-capitalist patterns.

The turmoil in the 'awakening' backward regions cannot be ended by aiding their development, as it is this development which causes the ferment. A changed world situation prevents this development from following the direction of the *laissez faire* ideology. In all Western nations government control over the economy, and over social life in general, has

<sup>14</sup> *The New York Times*, 8th April, 1950.

<sup>15</sup> Dean Acheson in an *Address on U.S. policy in Asia* before the Commonwealth Club of California. (*The New York Times*, 16th March, 1950.)

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

been steadily increasing. This has long been a fact in Russia, and it is nearing completion in her satellites. Even the American economy operates more upon government than upon private capital. Under such conditions, China's development, for example, could only lead to the completion of the totalitarian structure prepared by the *Kuomintang*. By supporting this type of development, as John King Fairbank writes, 'Russia is still turning to her ends the potentialities of revolution in backward areas'. As the first prerequisite for a successful power competition in Asia, he suggests 'a continued evolutionary development in the United States', the content of which, however, he does not reveal. But this mysterious 'evolution' is to enable America 'to retain leadership in the world-wide struggle for individual political liberty while at the same time aiding other peoples in poorer circumstances to develop whatever degrees of collectivist or socialist economy they need to meet their problems'.<sup>17</sup>

But why stop there? Why not include the 'people in poorer circumstances' who are in Europe, or even in the United States? However, as little as Russia is inclined to support private property in the United States, just as little could America be interested in the development of state-capitalist systems abroad. In the second world war, to be sure, totalitarian and democratic nations fought as allies against other authoritarian powers, and even to-day American and British loans reach Yugoslavia. But such alliances do not affect the differences between the competing social systems, even though the imperialist division between authoritarian and democratic regimes is reflected in all the liberalistic nations as the problem of state-control and nationalization. What in some countries still appears as a conflict between government and business, manifests itself on the world-wide scale as an opposition between 'communism' and capitalism. Still, the opposition is real and cannot be resolved by way of argument. Professor Fairbank's improvement upon the propaganda-slogan of the peaceful side-by-side existence of capitalism and socialism is even less realistic than the original. It overlooks, moreover, the fact that the totalitarian state with all its collectivization is not a socialist society, and it ignores the obvious dynamics of the prevailing social systems, whether based on private-property or state-ownership, which tend in the direction of a centralized world economy.

Notwithstanding these centralizing tendencies, nobody, of course, objects to the development of any part of the world 'in principle'. But it must not unfavourably affect the vested interests of to-day, it must not decrease the profitability of the existing capital, nor diminish the political power of the dominating states. If possible, it must be a controlled development, suited to the economic, political and strategical needs of the great powers. Thus conditioned, the 'principle' is violated more often than not, and foreign development, in practice, is furthered by advanced nations only to the extent to which it enhances the interests of the latter. The emphasis, to be sure, is now on power; yet, power for its own sake is neither a capitalist ideal nor a solution for the prevailing social and economic problems. It is used so as to lead to a return of world conditions, in which nothing matters but profitability, seen as the medium for a boundless capital formation on which the general welfare presumably depends.

From the point of view of power politics, however, it appears more

<sup>17</sup> *The United States and China*, Harvard University Press, 1948, p. 339.



practicable to retain the strength of the West-European nations than to create new allies for America in the backward regions; quite aside from the question whether or not the under-developed countries would be willing to accept this honour. To turn these areas into formidable obstacles in the way of Russian imperialism would require far greater supplies than those needed to bolster the Atlantic defences. Moreover, the backward nations offer fewer guarantees that American aid will not be turned against American interests. That Western Europe has priority in American strategy is clear also to the Europeans, for otherwise England would not be able to suggest that American aid to South-East Asia should be accompanied by a proportionate reduction of the British debts in that area, that is, be turned into aid to Britain. Otherwise they would not present the solid anti-Russian front of to-day, or carry on their own colonial policies in contradiction to the promises of 'Point Four'.

At any rate, the distribution of American surplus production all over the globe would spread it ineffectually thin. American-Russian relations have reached a point of deterioration, where all policy is geared to the eventuality of war. At such a time, when 'a massing of Russian troops on the Yugoslav border, or anywhere else in Europe, could add three to four billion dollars to the country's present budget',<sup>18</sup> one cannot expect much sympathy for the long-run needs of the world economy as a whole. Particularly not in face of a government budget already exceeding 42 billion dollars, and in view of the forthcoming additional expenditures set by the stockpiling of critical raw materials, the development of new and ever costlier weapons, and the general increase of a type of production 'consumable' only by war. Indeed, in the world as it is to-day, a consideration of the long-run needs of the world can lead to a desire for war, in order to remove the obstacles to this end, if only to stop a development which threatens to turn most of the world's labour into Sisyphus-labour.

#### IV

It is in order to escape the inextricable consequences of a consistent power policy, that the suggestions for a global Marshall Plan are made. It seems more rational to pay for the avoidance of war than to pay and die in actual warfare. And if the war should come nevertheless, the allies who shall have been won by such a policy would still enhance the cause of the United States. This seems especially plausible to those who think that help extended to the outside world will ultimately benefit America's economy as well, and who feel sure that an uninterrupted general increase of production will profit all nations and may be instrumental in the pacification of the world. The theoretical background for this trend of thought is to be found in John Maynard Keynes' theories of the depression years.

Economic stagnation, large-scale unemployment, and the eclipse of international trade had led Keynes to the conclusion, that the classical theory of a self-adjusting market mechanism can work only under special circumstances which, however, no longer exist. He held that in a 'mature' capitalist system an economic equilibrium with full employment needs for its realization government interferences which would further the investment

<sup>18</sup> Frank Pace, Jr., Director of the Budget, in a speech before the American Retail Federation. (*The New York Times*, 4th April, 1950.)

of capital. They were to overcome a so-called 'liquidity preference' on the part of the capitalists, who, beset by fear of a declining profitability, were thought to be engaged in a kind of investment strike. In Keynes' view, the 'liquidity preference' could be broken by monetary policies which lowered the rate of interest. Economic activity could be bolstered by fiscal policies, manipulating government revenues and expenditures so as to compensate for changes in private demand. Large public works could initiate an all-round advance of economic enterprise and, finally, a wisely planned state-controlled investment policy would possibly end depressions altogether. The simultaneous pursuit of these policies by all countries would increase both the level of domestic employment and the volume of international trade. This involved abandonment of a fixed gold standard and a return to some protectionist practices, but Keynes was convinced that the discarding of the traditional rules of international trade need not lead to an injurious competition for a favourable balance-of-trade. It would rather offer the existing equilibrium tendencies an opportunity to operate under conditions of expansion instead of conditions of contraction.

Keynes thought that a controlled monetary inflation and deficit-financing would enable the government to resume, increase, and regulate production. With the economy again in full swing, the deficit could be recovered and the money stabilized. And the Keynesian theories found application during the depression and ever since. Those who oppose this theory of 'spending' point to an inescapable and finally unbearable interest burden in the wake of an increasing government debt, which, by hampering private enterprise, will undo the temporary gains with a vengeance. Against this, it is said that a certain proportionate development between the national income and the national debt, would render the latter harmless. It is also argued, that an internal debt cannot really be considered a debt, as the money taken out of the system is again returned to it; that from a 'social point of view' the whole procedure may be looked upon as a mere matter of book-keeping. Theoretically it is not difficult to project this position from the national to the international scene. And this projection is made easy by the actual dependence of the Western world upon the American economy, and by the division of the world into two competing socio-economic systems. If it is true that the nations of the Western world stand or fall together, they may very well be considered an entity. If the Western world is not such in fact, a development in this direction would no doubt be furthered by the adoption of a 'social point of view' which transcends the narrow national interests.

A slackening economy, according to Keynes, may be revived by fostering either the 'inducement to invest' or the 'propensity to consume', or else by attending to both simultaneously. He favoured an emphasis upon the 'inducement to invest', as he found even the 'mature' society short on productive capital. There are others, of course, who would like to emphasize the 'propensity to consume' but do not know how to go about it. The only kind of 'consumption' which has thus far been favoured, was the destructive consumption of war. This makes the 'mature' society somewhat less mature and finds the world in still greater need of additional capital. Keynes saw the dilemma, but in face of large-scale unemployment, he thought that even wasteful loan expenditure might enrich the community. 'Pyramid-building,

earthquakes, even wars may serve to increase wealth,' he said, 'if the education of our statesmen on the principles of the classical economics stands in the way to anything better.'<sup>18</sup> And war, including deficit-financing on an unprecedented scale, did give an enormous impetus to the expansion of the American economy. Of course, some other countries did not do as well, and still others were reduced to rubble in the process, but for America war did 'enrich the community'.

Now, however, an old problem arose anew: what to do with the additional productive capacity acquired during the war? Even before the war, 'effective demand' had not been large enough to assure full employment. To many people, the answer to this problem is quite simple; all that is necessary for a full utilization of America's productive capacities, they think, is to create 'effective demand' for peaceful purposes, just as it had been created for purposes of war. Some, like Thurman Arnold, think that the destruction of Europe has solved the problem already. 'During the depression,' he said, 'we got nowhere. The great lack was the absence of effective demand for our production. Lately these demands have been created out of sheer necessity, and I think we are in a dawn of the greatest industrial era this country has ever had.'<sup>19</sup> When questioned, 'whether he really thinks that in order to have prosperity we are in need of the destruction of war', Arnold answered: 'Of course destruction is sometimes necessary. When Hitler achieved power, the destruction seemed necessary. . . Now it is necessary to meet the threat of Russia . . . and perhaps a certain amount of destruction or dislocation may accompany the threat, but it is necessary to do it. And what has happened because of that necessity? We have gotten on our toes and we are going places.'<sup>20</sup>

As the ideas of the Marshall-planners admittedly do not spring from a newly-arisen sense of international solidarity, but from the consideration of ways and means to stop Russian expansionism, it is clear that they assume that 'just as in the case of the destructive demands of war, the momentarily 'uneconomical' dispersion of American surplus-production may lead in the end to an 'effective demand' allowing the American economy to operate at full capacity even under conditions of peace. Behind this reasoning lies the conviction, that American production needs an 'effective demand' larger than that brought forth within the boundaries of the American economy; that for the latter to flourish, the world must be ready and willing to buy her products. It must be a world of 'open doors', of free competition, in which the United States could not fail to succeed because of her dominant position in production.

However, the greater the optimism with regard to modern productive capabilities, the more pessimistic the outlook with regard to 'effective demand'. It is widely feared, that the end of Marshall Plan aid will be a catastrophe for both Europe and the United States. Foreign aid, it is held, provided a 'market' for American goods otherwise unsaleable. The European revival is based on production for exports, which the United States cannot

<sup>18</sup> *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*, New York, 1936, p. 129.

<sup>19</sup> Proceedings of a Conference sponsored by 'The Economic and Business Foundation', New Wilmington, Pa., 20th December, 1948, p. 18.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21.

accept, and the backward nations cannot afford. Despite its vast devastation, Western Europe suffers already from an unmarketable surplus of steel, coal, and other industrial commodities. Because there is no demand for European goods in America, there is no 'effective demand' for American goods in Europe. To better their balance-of-trade, the European nations cut or freeze their wages, reduce their imports, and drive for greater exports, regardless of the needs at home or the repercussions in other countries. The general drive for greater production, it is feared, will end in a new and world-wide depression. 'Unless we can adjust human society so that the two dangers — revolt against poverty and unmarketable surpluses — cancel each other out,' said Lord Boyd Orr, 'our civilization cannot survive even if another atom bomb is never dropped.'<sup>22</sup>

While there is a lack of 'effective demand', there is, of course, a great need of food, coal, steel, and all kinds of commodities. Despite Marshall Aid, and despite the 'surpluses' of the revived European economy, her people lack adequate food, lack coal to heat their dwellings, lack steel to rebuild their bomb-torn cities. In America, too, in spite of her surplus-production, a large minority lives in dire need and a majority hopes to better itself. The use of the actual and the potential surpluses would, indeed, require the adoption of an internationally-oriented 'social point of view'. But, then, the 'surpluses' would be recognized for what they are, a grotesque and misleading mask of well-being upon the emaciated face of uncountable unstilled wants. The world would stand revealed as one of great shortages, generally in need of social and industrial emancipation, so as to lighten the burden of the people in the advanced as well as in the backward nations.

To have an immediate effect, a 'social point of view' could find realization only in the free sharing of the world's surpluses, based on urgencies of need. In the long run, it would have to lead to the re-organization of the world economy and the re-division of its labour toward a world-wide co-operation tending to end the economic and political phases of human misery. At this time, however, the 'social point of view' is confined to the playful speculations of economic theorists, and even here, it is a social point of view with limitations. In its present form, it is a point of view leading to a conscious search for ways and means to maintain the social *status quo*. To the economists, this means first of all guaranteeing full employment or, at any rate, hindering the rise of large-scale unemployment.

Between the twin-evils of unemployment and over-production, it is the latter which seems to many people the lesser one. It is in any case easier to get rid of surplus commodities than of a surplus population, which, furthermore, may be needed again for a sudden expansion of industrial activity. However, as wages are 'costs of production', the maintenance of profitability of the producing enterprises excludes the distribution of the surplus product via the wage system. This system itself excludes 'free distribution' to the needy layers of society on any significant scale, for under the wage-system people work only if they must. Under conditions of a declining international trade, the physical character of the surplus product may exclude its consumption altogether, or over-production may exist in all fields of production simultaneously. Because of these and other reasons, the hope to rid society

<sup>22</sup> *The New York Times*, 1st May, 1950.

of its over-production through foreign aid is irresistible, as this seems to leave the social and economic conditions at home largely undisturbed.

But not for long. It is not difficult to propagandize the working population to produce for foreign aid, as they have very little say in such matters anyway. But it is less easy, and bound to become impossible, to convince the entrepreneurs and businessmen that sharing America's wealth with other nations will serve their own ends too. Although a foreign aid programme allows for a larger production than would be possible without it, the government 'buys' the surplus commodities with funds extracted from the community. And though in this way it helps some corporations which could not function without a steady demand, it helps them at the expense of others which are still able to function independently. To the latter, foreign aid means merely a greater tax-burden, reducing their incomes and limiting their expansion, thus endangering their very existence. They are opposed to it in the sense in which they are opposed to public work programmes, which also affect some interests favourably and others unfavourably. They prefer less than full employment, which brings with it a readier acceptance of an increased productivity by stationary, or slower rising, wages. They favour the conditions that make for an increase of the market-demand through lower costs. And in so far as they are able to assert themselves, they will limit the foreign aid programme.

As a means to secure full employment at home, the foreign aid programme raises a question of expediency; whether to cut down production and feed the unemployed, or to keep employment up by supporting foreign governments and businesses. Foreign aid would here be a type of hidden unemployment, an expensive form of work-relief. And the arguments for and against public work programmes would cover those on the question of foreign aid. However, just as a continuous increase of public works would disturb private enterprise, since it limits its sphere of action and hampers its expansion, so would a constant out-flow of surplus production financed by public funds, for this, too, sets borders to business extension and leads from stagnation to decay. It would amount to a reversal of the hitherto practised policy of private wealth concentration, which would violate all the rules that sustain the prevailing society. It could end only in the dreaded nationalized economy, which it set out to prevent. It may, perhaps, arrest the growth of 'socialism' in other nations, but only to further it in the United States. Self-defeating as a permanent and large-scale policy, it will be employed only as an instrument of power politics designed to secure the free capitalist world. — The Hottentots will have to get along without a Rolls-Royce.

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#### NOT 'WE' BUT YOU MR. MAYHEW

Mr. C. Mayhew, a former *Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs*, broadcasting last night, said that . . . the Russians were also helped by the fact that, in resisting aggressors, we sometimes seemed to find ourselves rushing to the rescue of somewhat unprepossessing political régimes.

*The Times*, 23rd October, 1950. [Our italics.]

# MATERIAL AND DOCUMENTS

## THE REMILITARIZATION OF GERMANY

### I. THE CONFESSIONAL CHURCH

#### Introduction

In the first years after the end of the war there were in Germany only isolated voices that ventured to break through the ruling conformism and attempted to create an independent movement. We think here especially of Pastor Knees who had to pay for his radical struggle for democratic and national rights with a three-year prison sentence. The threatened danger of war and especially the planned remilitarization of Germany, however, have shaken many people out of their lethargy and increasingly created movements which, with differing degrees of clarity, turn against the totalitarian danger, and with us try to find a way of preventing the war.

The most confused among these movements is the 'Nauheim Circle' around Professor Noack which attracted a certain amount of attention beyond the borders of Germany, but which possesses not the slightest progressive significance. These 'Realpolitik' visionaries with their 'philosophy of non-envy' make a virtue out of Germany's exigency and, like modern Talleyrands, attempt to perpetuate existing conditions by exploiting the power politics of the Occupiers, and to establish a system that satisfies all and sundry.

The various groups which oppose war in principle and which advocate non-violence and conscientious objection are much more serious and militant and contain tendencies capable of progressive development. But from the outset they block the way towards a principled opposition by maintaining the pacifist ideology, and by not realizing that pacifism as a political doctrine has more than proved its inadequacy.

One of the clearest and most comprehensive is the movement against remilitarization recently initiated by the Confessional Church. This group played a progressive rôle once before, when it began what could have become the most significant resistance movement against Hitler. At that time, it is true, the Church movement, not understanding how to set itself more embracing democratic aims beyond the narrow framework of the Church struggle, and because of the inadequacy and readiness to compromise of its leaders (e.g. Niemöller) had to fail.

The present action of the Confessional Church shows that the movement has become substantially more mature and, in spite of limitations, possesses a political clear-sightedness which distinguishes it favourably from most of the sterile 'left' groupings. If, along with other independent forces, and through open discussion with them, it continues consistently along the road taken, it can overcome its limitations and give an enormous impetus to the opposition smouldering among the people against power politics and Eastern and Western totalitarianism. Therefore we unreservedly support the present action of the Confessional Church, and willingly put at its



disposal the columns of our magazine in order to extend the movement and to strengthen it through open discussion. We begin with a translation of the most important parts of their recently published pamphlet which is one of the most important political documents published in Germany during recent years, and which, in spite of all flaws, represents a valuable basis for wide-scale action and discussion furthering such action.

### An Die Gewehre? Nein!

1. . . . We Germans must keep out of the conflict of the world Powers. We must not take sides with either the one or the other,

- (a) for this conflict is a struggle of ideologies. . . .
- (b) whoever takes sides becomes a vassal of one of the ideologically determined Power blocs.
- (c) whoever in this conflict is committed onesidedly to either of the two great Powers is compelled to arm. Under no circumstances is the possibility given to us Germans to-day of a 'just war'.
- (d) We see the untruthfulness revealed in the propaganda of both adversaries. Recognition of this falsehood in addition prohibits the taking of sides.

2. We reject a remilitarization of Germany because, with faith in Jesus Christ, we do not hope for help for our people either from foreign military Powers or from any military Powers.

- (a) This rejection is not based on anti-militarist resentment nor on a feeling of the injured honour of soldiers.
  - (b) In this rejection we believe we are at one with the majority of the German people. If the democratic constitution of our State is not to become a mere façade, a decision of such gravity as that of rearmament must not be made against the majority of the people. Remilitarization against the will of the greatest part of the people would establish that the freedom which is supposed to be defended is already lost.
  - (c) The providing of armed forces by Germany would not maintain peace but would provoke war, for armament potential is not a static power, but a dynamic force impelling towards its use.
  - (d) We do not advocate a political pacifism, but we have to count with the fact that remilitarization under present conditions is unavoidably bound up with a radical dismemberment of Germany. The consequence would be civil and partisan war. Scorched earth strategy would transform a warring Germany into a heap of ruins.
  - (e) Therefore Germany must not attempt to obtain new Sovereignty rights in exchange for the furnishing of troops, and in order that it might join the ranks of the Western Powers as an equal member of one of the two Power blocs. From remilitarization, in the final analysis, only war is to be expected, and from war nothing but destruction. . . .
- . . . .
- (h) In Germany's present situation, therefore, we refuse conscription, regardless of whether the right to refuse is secured by the Constitution or not. We encourage everyone to do, with good conscience, the same. We ask everyone to fight for the retention of this right in the

Constitution of the Bundesrepublik and the Länder. Whoever in consequence of the refusal to be conscripted should suffer injury to person, prestige or property can be sure of the intercession and help of the Christian Community. . . .

3. With regard to the projected strengthening of the police force, the question must be asked whether this will serve only for the protection of law and order. There is the danger of the State developing into a Police State. In a good State as much justice as possible and only as much force as necessary should be exercised.

Western Germany should not begin to adopt the principle hitherto fought against, of the German Democratic Republic [Russian-occupied Germany—Eds.]. We recognize that for the maintenance of order and for fighting crime an improvement of the police organization and the widening of the powers of the police are necessary, but there are already voices to be heard to-day which desire a strengthened police force as a means of political power for the Government parties and also for the Opposition. In this is revealed the tendency towards a political police force which, in accordance with its inherent law, impels towards the pattern of the Gestapo and the N.K.V.D., and so to the administrative dissolution of legal order.

The call for the strengthening of the police is supported by propaganda which, by exaggerating the communist menace within, attempts to influence public opinion politically. We must be suspicious of every demand which is supported by untrue assertions. . . .

4. Every step towards rearmament has to be rejected, because the accumulation of war material leads to war, from which no help for humanity can be expected. If Germany should be ordered to supply war material it can yield only to force as on the question of dismantling. We must not try to get armament orders for the sake of a momentary advantage or profit. To expect this to benefit the economy or to overcome unemployment would be self-deception. . . .

5. God in His Judgement gave us social need as our task. In the five years since the collapse we have not solved this task. We are in danger to-day of escaping from the tackling of the social questions into rearmament.

Instead of spending our last pennies on rearmament we should use them for the solution of the refugee question, housing schemes and aid for training unemployed youths. More urgent for us than rearmament, are the questions of social reform, the right of consultation, a balanced price and wage structure and a socially just credit system. . . .

The draining of labour power and raw materials into the armaments industry hinders the production of vital consumer goods and consequently increases our poverty. But at the end, there is death!

6. The guarantee of legal order and the establishment of social order are the most effective means, perhaps the only effective means, of overcoming Bolshevism.

Imitation of bolshevist and fascist methods, i.e., the punishing of and discrimination against people guilty of no crime but solely because of their opinions must inevitably bring nearer the system being fought against. The present practice of general discrimination against people solely because

they belong to certain organizations or societies, can only be considered as the parallel of the 'Civil Service Laws' of the Third Reich and the systematic denazification. We do not say this in order to commend Communism which for its part applies the same methods, but because it is our wish that it be overcome by a better order. We stand on the stipulation of the Constitution of the Bundesrepublik, Article 3, 3: 'Nobody must be discriminated against or be privileged because of sex, descent, race, country and origin, faith, religious or political opinions.'

Therefore we will not tolerate that people should be once again stamped as 'subhuman' and as such be persecuted, just because they have a different opinion from ours. This happened once before, in 1933, to the misfortune of us all. . . .

We ask all brothers to consider whether they must not go with us along this road as the one imposed on us by God.

Second Congress of the Brotherhood of the Confessional Church, October, 1950, in Darmstadt.

(Responsible editor: Pastor Herbert Mochalski, Darmstadt, Roquetteweg 15.)

### Comment

It is understandable that the authors of this statement are considered troublesome by the Church authorities and were called to order. But in contrast to Bishop Dibelius who warns them against sticking their noses too much into issues outside church affairs, we should like to criticize from the opposite point of view and appeal to them to go more deeply and thoroughly into the political questions which decide our fate, and not to stop at half measures and inconsistencies which can only too easily lead to a relapse into the inadequacies of the previous Church movement.

The direction in which we want to urge the movement can be indicated shortly in four points:

1. The pamphlet stresses that *the untruthfulness of the propaganda* of both power groups prohibits the taking of sides. Quite correct. But the authors should recognize that this statement involves a whole programme and it is incumbent upon them not to remain satisfied with a *general* denunciation of the official lying propaganda, but to attack political lying all along the line, to expose it concretely in every individual case and to call to account those in Press and Government responsible for it. Activity of this kind would destroy the whole fabric of lies created for the preparation and ideological adornment of war, and would contribute much more to the prevention of the war than just 'not taking sides' (conscientious objection). It would also expose the myth of the 'ideological struggle' between East and West, into which trap the authors themselves have fallen.

2. 'We Germans must *keep out* of the conflict of the world powers.' Again correct. But the authors must also realize that this demand takes on meaning only when it is extended to include the French, the English, the Americans, etc., and . . . the Russians! For to aim only at a special solution for Germany is illusory and brings them very near to the position of the 'Nauheim Circle'. While it is indispensable for Germans to make a start in Germany and the more intransigent the better (cleanliness always begins at home) nevertheless German difficulties can alone be removed in the

process of overcoming the world problems and the German movement against remilitarization can only succeed as part of the world movement against power politics. Therefore it would be more fruitful to ask: How can we Germans, together with other suppressed peoples and the great majority of the people who suffer because of power politics, contribute practically, in order to avoid war, which would destroy not only Germany, but the whole of world civilization? The German movements must give all aid in propaganda, actions, etc., to resistance outside Germany and in this way create indispensable allies. This recognition is decisive.

3. The defence of democratic rights for *all* as demanded by the pamphlet is of the greatest significance. But any real struggle for these rights cannot take place except on the basis of the national self-determination of Germany (as in all colonies). The statement that no help can be expected from foreign military powers needs, as supplement, the demand for the withdrawal of *all* occupation forces and the removal of the veiled military dictatorship which renders any free political and economic development impossible. Here the courageous behaviour of Pastor Knees can serve as a model. He did not react to the dismantling of German factories with a simple 'we must yield to force', but represented the interests of the German people more actively by recommending, in a special appeal, effective methods of passive resistance. (See CONTEMPORARY ISSUES No. 1.)

4. The pamphlet is on the right track in indicating that the most urgent task is the *removal of social need*, and it correctly stresses that rearmament prevents the production of necessary consumer goods. Here it proceeds in the direction of a *positive* solution and points to the necessary concrete *alternative*, although it conceives of need as determined by fate and remains satisfied with mere relief measures. But social need is not 'given to us by God as our task', it is maintained artificially by men and can be overcome on a world scale in the shortest time were there no longer profit production for destruction, but instead, production for human use. It must be shown that, with rational use of the available resources and highly developed productive forces, enough goods can be produced to remove need and make superfluous not only a strengthening of the police force but of the police altogether — and war.

We would be pleased if supporters of the Confessional Church as well as other readers would lead further points into the debate being conducted between 'war mongers' like Josef Mackiewicz and Oscar Fischer and 'peace mongers' like Ernst Zander and E. V. Swart. (In CONTEMPORARY ISSUES Nos. 6, 7 and this issue.)

## 2. A GOOD PROPOSAL

At the time of receiving the pamphlet commented upon above we also received a letter from a reader in Germany also aroused by the projected remilitarization and who submitted to us a clearly sketched suggestion for a leaflet. Frau A., who apparently comes from a milieu very different from that of the Confessional Church, reveals a great measure of political understanding and her sketch, by its grasp of the social and political connections, renders valuable support to the Church movement. We gladly accept her proposal and intend publishing shortly a leaflet based on her

sketch — and this also because we have here another concrete example of how we understand the 'breaking of the editorial dictatorship' through an open dialogue between magazine and reader.

Naturally in this leaflet we will try to improve upon Frau A.'s proposal. For, to take only the most important point, the slogan of 'spiritual resistance' and the demand for a free plebiscite only have positive significance if they are supplemented by the demonstration of an alternative, that is, the concrete way, indicated above, of preventing the war.

#### Letter from Frau A.

After having read several issues of DINGE DER ZEIT I should like to approach you to-day with a proposal for a new leaflet, on the subject of the Allied plan of remilitarizing Western Germany.

I think that the present phase of America's Germany policy offers a favourable field of action because it can be regarded as premature. Public opinion is not yet prepared easily to accept military projects and, after five years of 'collective guilt' and 'war crimes', it is likely to be difficult to appeal to the 'old military traditions of Germany' (recent U.S.A. propaganda). What takes the wind out of the sails of a general resistance against this infamous cynicism is the widespread apathy which arises from a feeling of complete helplessness due to being at the mercy of certain powers which seem invulnerable. The governing circles in Bonn have long been discredited in the eyes of the people as being marionettes, mainly of American politics, and can only exert influence through Press and clergy.

With the exception of diehard militarists, the upper bureaucracy and big capital, probably very few advocates of remilitarization can be found. On the other hand, in the fight against remilitarization, the support of wide layers of the people can be counted on, i.e., large sections of the working class, of the Protestant rural population, of various middle-class elements in the towns, of the professional classes (those not in the service of the State), of the women of all strata and of the Eastern refugees. After their bad experience under two government systems, war widows and Eastern refugees would probably be especially receptive to antifascist ideas (I purposely here characterize the American system as fascist, because it will eventually apply open fascist methods).

Taking into account all these considerations, the question is how to work out an effective leaflet. In regard to the content of this leaflet I should like to make the following general proposals:

1. First an analysis of the pro-militarist arguments and a characterization of the real relationship between America and Russia would be necessary (e.g., exposing the Russian invasion psychosis now being used as a justification for general rearmament . . .). Then attention must be drawn to the Allies' fear, particularly England's, of German competition, which is already in a position to put high-grade machinery on the market. (By directing this unwelcome production into armament channels, two birds can be killed with one stone: elimination of competition and further strengthening of their own power).

2. It must be shown that remilitarization does not offer a lasting solution, neither of the existing nor the future dilemma, that therefore the alternative is not: remilitarization or Russian invasion, but remilitarization

or democracy, i.e., retention of the rights of free citizens. For if full rearmament takes place, i.e., if a German Army of 60-100 divisions is raised, equipped with the most modern weapons, and which is really able to stop the Russian steamroller, then the living standard of the German people will be automatically lowered to the level of the 'People's Democracy' of the East (for who has to pay?). . . .

3. The Russian-American relationship remains to be politically clarified (as if Russia has anything to do with Communism, and America with real democracy!). It would be very important to expose thoroughly the propaganda of both systems, with an exact definition of the two concepts Democracy and Socialism. It follows logically from this elucidation that in reality Russia and America are not contradictory and that the conflict of the apparent enemies is a struggle *inter aequales*. It must also be stressed that the certain measure of freedom of speech and Press (the American Zone, for instance, always distinguished itself favourably from the three other Zones) belongs to the relics of the early history of the New Continent. It must be shown that America needs Russia in order to achieve its fascist plans, and that in the decisions of Yalta and Potsdam the U.S.A. themselves created the preconditions.

4. Thus remilitarization cannot lead to a solution of the burning problems, but can only mean a strengthening of the totalitarian and semi-fascist rulers. Therefore the only consideration is spiritual resistance. The first expression of this resistance must be the demand for an immediate plebiscite, in the form of a free and secret referendum in accordance with the rights granted in the constitution. The subject of the plebiscite is to be the remilitarization plan and its harbinger: Herr Adenauer's strengthened police force!

Perhaps it is possible for you to develop these four points in clear and condensed form, into an effective leaflet. I would appreciate having your opinion on this.

## A 'DENIAL' BY PASTOR NIEMÖLLER

We have received the following letter from Pastor Niemöller:

Wiesbaden, 7th November, 1950.

Dear Sirs,

In No. 7 of DINGE DER ZEIT sent to me, I find statements which, in the interests of truth, cannot remain uncontradicted:

1. On pages 473-74 in the Knees case\* you give an account of the activity of my secretariat which must create the impression that it had judged superficially, without going to the heart of the matter. As against

\*The article referred to was not printed in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, and the relevant extract is as follows:

"There too," (namely in Werl prison), "he is creating many difficulties for himself by his attitude." Who speaks of Pastor Knees' protest against injustice in these words? None other than Pastor Niemöller — or, to be more precise — his secretariat, for the former parson of Dahlem who, under Hitler, created "certain difficulties for himself by his attitude", is now advanced to Church President and



this, I must assure you that I myself gathered detailed information from the competent Church authorities and that you were expressly informed that these enquiries took place, in the first sentence of the letter of 6.6.50 from my secretariat.

2. The assertion on page 443\*\* about 'relations' is so wrong and unfounded as not to be worth the paper on which it is printed. A query directed to me or to my secretariat, would soon have taught you better.

Yours faithfully,

(signed) D. Niemöller.

1. Should we, unintentionally, have created the impression that Pastor Niemöller judged superficially, we honestly regret this. We gladly take note that he has gone to 'the heart of the matter'. But by his 'explanation' he only makes his case worse! For if, *in spite of his exact knowledge of the facts*, he does not consider it necessary publicly to repudiate a blatant infringement of democratic rights on the part of the Occupation authorities, and to fight for the release of Pastor Knees, he only furnishes further proof of the fact that the real fight for democratic freedoms lies outside his sphere of interests.

2. We can very well imagine that Herr Pastor Niemöller does not take kindly to the word 'relations'; in effect however, all former prominent opponents of Hitler in one way or another aimed at settling their specific 'relations' to the system — in the same way that to-day many of the 'opponents' are trying hard to come to a 'working' arrangement with totalitarianism whether of the eastern or western kind.

Naturally, every man has the good right to err and to change his opinion, but if he is a public figure and especially if he makes himself the spokesman of a popular movement, it is incumbent upon him to correct and account publicly for a recognized error. Pastor Niemöller, however, whose courageous opposition to Hitler was limited entirely to the defence of the rights of the Church, and who, on his own admission, was 'politically' in agreement with the Nazis, fails to give any accounting and attempts to counter us with the simple accusation that we have made false and unfounded statements.

What is false and unfounded is the assertion spread by influential 'anti-fascists' in Germany and abroad that Pastor Niemöller was the representa-

can no longer answer letters himself about an imprisoned parson. His secretary, however, writes:

"Certainly one can condemn the procedure against Pastor Knees as psychologically false since it is extremely unlikely to change him as a typical *conscientious objector*, but from a juridical point of view, Herr Church President D. Niemöller sees no possibility of intervening successfully on behalf of Pastor Knees."

We did not, in fact, turn to D. Niemöller for legal advice but in order to ascertain whether or not the former fighter for freedom of conscience would support one of his former followers who has not changed his principles since 1945. But the secretariat, which must know this, can only say publicly about the prison sentence imposed for public expression of opinion that it is extremely unlikely to transform the inconvenient critic (for this is how we must translate the term "conscientious objector" in this instance) into an obedient yes-man.

\*\* CONTEMPORARY ISSUES No. 7, p. 178.

tive and the 'soul' of German resistance against Hitler; and as with all myth-building, it is correct and necessary to destroy this 'Niemöller myth' and on occasion to remind the public of the historical facts. As Pastor Niemöller seems to have forgotten these facts, we are compelled to sacrifice even more paper and to corroborate our 'assertion' by reprinting for his benefit and that of other readers the following excerpt from the *New York Times* (6th June, 1945):

'Naples, 5th June — Germany is unsuited to any form of democratic government so far tried in western countries, according to five prominent anti-nazis interviewed here to-day.

Pastor Martin Niemöller, who won fame by his courageous opposition to the Nazis from the pulpit, expressed this view in which the four others concurred.

"The German people like to be governed, not to mingle in politics," Herr Niemöller said. "The greatest shortcoming of the Weimar Republic was that it never could impose authority on the German people, which longed for such authority." . . .

Pastor Niemöller admitted that from his concentration camp he had offered his services "in any capacity" to the German Navy when war began, but he explained that he did so as a German father whose sons had been drafted into the fighting line. He did not claim any political opposition to the Nazis; he said that as a churchman he was not interested in politics, but that he was unable to accept any authority that claimed a right to override that of the Church. . . .'

We do not doubt that Pastor Niemöller has since somewhat revised these totally undemocratic views. But on the showing alone of his 'explanation' to us, it is sufficiently obvious that he still has much more in common with totalitarianism than with democracy. For a democrat willingly submits to public scrutiny.

This controversy however, does not prevent us from supporting Pastor Niemöller insofar as he takes part in the movement of the Confessional Church against remilitarization. But we must not forget that on the continued basis of his refusal to hold himself responsible to the public and give a public accounting he — in spite of his radical language and his defiant attitude toward the Church authorities — belongs to those forces which can only prevent a positive development of the movement and bring about its failure and which, therefore, must be carefully watched and sharply criticized.

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